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JEROME G. ROSE*

Farmland Preservation Policy
and Programst
INTRODUCTION: IS THERE A FARMLAND PRESERVATION CRISIS?
The publication of the NationalAgricultural Lands Study (NALS)' in
1981 was followed by journal articles and newspaper reports that posed
the question: "Where have the farmlands gone?" 2 Some of these articles
expressed concern about the decrease in the amount of farmland and the
adverse effects upon the nation's capacity to produce food and fiber. On
the other hand, some critics of the NALS have questioned the data and
the conclusions of that study.3

This debate raised the following question: To what extent is there a
farmland crisis in fact? To help try to find an answer to this question the
major arguments and conclusions of fact on both sides of the issue must
be reviewed.
Arguments in Support of the FarmlandCrisis Thesis.
The underlying thesis of the farmland crisis argument is that the supply
offarmland is declining at the same time that the demandfor agricultural
products is increasing. The NALS takes the position that the supply of
farmland will continue to decrease because of the following forces currently in motion:
0 Three million acres of agricultural land are taken out of production
each year in the United States. Over one-third of this land is
cropland or pasture. The problem is aggravated by the fact that
many cities *ere originally settled on or near prime agricultural
land so that the development of suburbs results in the destruction
of some of the best agricultural land. As farmland near cities is
*Professor of Urban Planning, Rutgers University; Editor in Chief, Real Estate Law Journal;
B.A., Cornell University, 1948; J.D. Harvard University, 1951.
'Copyright © 1983 by Jerome G. Rose. This is part of a larger work on environmental regulation
of land use by the author.
1. R. COUGHLIN & J. KEENE, NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY, THE PROTECTION OF FARMLAND: A REFERENCE GUIDEBOOK FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, -USDA National Agricultural Lands Study, 1981) (hereinafter referred to as NALS).
2. See, e.g., FIELDS, WHERE HAVE THE FARMLANDS GONE? (National Agricultural Lands
Study, Council on Environmental Quality, 1979); Lutrell, Our 'Shrinking' Farmland:Mirage or
Potential Crisis, in REVIEW (October, 1980); Crosson, The Long-Term Adequacy ofAgricultural
Land In the United States, in THE CROPLAND CRISIS, MYTH OR REALITY? (1982).
3. See, e.g., Lutrell, supra note 2, Crosson, supra note 2.
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used for development, truck farming near the cities is eliminated
and cities become more dependent upon food supplies shipped
from great distances at increased monetary and energy costs.
Millions of tons of topsoil are lost each year through erosion partly
because export demands are stimulating the use of more intensive
farming methods and the cultivation of poorer land.
Some specialty crops, such as orange groves, cherry orchards,
avocadoes, cranberries, etc. grown only in certain areas are threatened with extinction by urban development.
Investors and developers, recognizing land's value for urban use,
purchase it at prices that exceed agricultural use value. These
purchases tend to increase the market values of nearby farmland.
Higher market values often lead to higher real property tax assessments.
Non-farm families living in developments adjacent to or near farms
complain about farm-produced smells, dust, spray and noise. As
the number of non-farm families increases, political power shifts
to them, and they may persuade city or county authorities to enact
and enforce nuisance ordinances against "excessive" smells, dust,
etc.
Public agencies decide to extend water, sewer, highway and other
services to non-agricultural areas that stimulate urban development.
With the advent of suburbanization, farmers reduce their expenditures for maintenance of land.
Tax rates climb rapidly because of greater demand for municipal
services by new residents.
Estates whose major assets are farm property suffer liquidity problems because they do not have enough cash to pay estate and
inheritance taxes. Executors may be forced to sell some or all of
the farm assets even though a relative wants to continue the farming
operation.
Farmers sell farms at high prices because of the strong demand
for development. 4

The NALS also argues that demand for farm products is increasing,
based on the following observations:
* The volume of agricultural exports has been rising an average of
10 percent a year and is expected to continue to increase. Agricultural exports account for 20 percent of the value in all U.S.
exports and can remain an important factor in the international
balance of payments.
4. See NALS, supra note 1, at 37; Roper, States Losing Battle To Save Farmland,The Sunday
Star-Ledger, May 20, 1979, at 23, col. 1.
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* Land requirements for energy production are increasing and can
be expected to increase further if gasohol production expands.
* Increases in the crop yields rate fell during the 1970s to a 0.75
percent annual rate of increase from 1.5 in the 1960s, and some
experts predict a leveling-off of crop yields so that more land will
be needed to increase production. More specifically, the volume
of production would have to be increased by 75 percent by the
year 52000 if projected domestic and export demands are to be
met.
There is a steady loss of farmland despite an increase in world-wide
demand for farm products. To reconcile this problem, NALS makes the
following recommendations.
* The Goals of Protecting Farmland and Guiding Urban Growth
Are Best Achieved Through the Use of a Comprehensive Growth
Management System
If a community seriously wants to protect its farmland, it must
find a way to deflect development away from productive agricultural land to areas where urban growth is most appropriate. To do
this the community may wish to use one of several growth management approaches, combined with several of the techniques
discussed in the study.
* Farmland Protection Programs Should Be Many-Faceted: The
Loss of FarmlandIs the Result of Many Factors
Some factors, such as rising real property taxes and special
assessments for water and sewer lines, reduce the desire and ability
of farmers to keep farming. Others, such as high offering prices
for farmland, lead directly to its sale. Effective programs will
address most of the major factors that lead to the conversion of
farmland.
" The States Should Provide the Key to Saving Farmland
States should declare their commitment to protect good agricultural land because it is a vital and irreplaceable resource. These
declarations will provide political and legal support for the efforts
of local government to protect farmland. To provide stronger programs, states should establish criteria concerning urban growth,
the protection of environmentally significant areas, and the protection of agricultural lands which local governments would be
required to meet in planning and regulating land use.
" It is Essential to Act Early
The sooner a program for protecting farmland can be started,
the better. If a community waits until development pressures become strong, farmers' and developers' expectations will have risen,
5. NALS, supra note 1, at 37.
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along with land values, and it will be much more difficult, politically, to get an effective program started.
ProgramsShould Be Based on Accurate Information
Communities need accurate, up-to-date information on natural
conditions, the importance of agriculture to their economies, land
use and ownership, and future trends of urbanization in order to
develop a farmland protection program that is well-conceived and
legally defensible.
Advocates of Farmland Protection Programs Should Make Sure
They Have Able, Dedicated, PoliticalLeadership
Effective programs must be tailored to local conditions. They
often involve unfamiliar concepts and techniques that may be
difficult for many farmers to accept. It takes astute, persuasive,
individuals to provide the leadership needed to design, enact, and
implement an effective program.
FarmlandProtectionShouldInvolve More than Land Use Controls
While incentives, land use controls, and comprehensive growth
management programs are important for any farmland protection
program, other measures are necessary to maintain the economic
viability of agriculture. Farmers need adequate credit, suppliers,
service businesses, labor, marketing facilities, and storage and
processing facilities.
FarmlandProtectionProgramsShould Be DesignedSo That They
Are Legally Defensible
Programs should be based on sound enabling legislation, developed through comprehensive planning and policies that give
appropriate recognition to low and moderate income housing, commercial and industrial development, and environmental protection
objectives. At the same time, they must not contravene the fundamental safeguards accorded to private property by the due process, equal protection and taking clauses of the United States
Constitution. 6

Arguments in Opposition to the FarmlandCrisis Thesis
The most direct and succinct response to the conclusions and recommendations of the NALS is contained in the policy statement adopted by
the Urban Land Institute. 7 The Urban Land Institute (ULI) disagrees with
both parts of the NALS thesis: (1) it questions the amount of farm land
lost to development and the seriousness of the decrease in farmland supply
and (2) it questions the NALS predictions of the amount of land needed
in the United States in the future to meet the domestic and export demand
6. Id. at 31.
7. Policy Statement of the Urban Land Institute Board of Directors in July, 1982, reprinted in
URBAN LAND 18 (July, 1982).
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for agricultural products. In addition, the ULI argues that policy decisions
relating to the need for farmland must also consider the prospects for
continued population growth and economic expansion that will require
additional land for urban development as well.
The ULI position on the supply of farmland is that the NALS estimate
of three million acres of cropland annually is lost to development and
other uses is either exaggerated or ultimately unimportant. The ULI argues
that the data used for the prediction has flaws and inconsistencies; but
even if the figure of three million acres per year removed from agricultural
use is correct, only part of this acreage represents high quality cropland.
Almost two-thirds of the land converted for development between 1967
and 1975 was in Class III or below. Only 23 percent of the converted
land came from cropland; about 19 percent was converted from range
and pasture land; 28 percent was from forest land; and 30 percent from
other land uses such as farm residences, hedgerows, coastal dunes, and
marshes.
The ULI also argues that the loss of farmland acreage is not serious
for the further reason that much of that loss is being replaced by additional
acres of cropland brought into cultivation. The argument is made that
there is much land not presently cultivated that can be made into farmland
by irrigating deserts and draining swamps. In addition, there is a large
supply of pasture, range, and forest lands that can be converted into
cropland.
The second part of ULI's argument is equally provocative. It raises
the question of the amount of land that will be needed in the future to
meet the demand for farm products. ULI questions the NALS prediction
that 89 to 140 million acres of cropland will be needed by the year 2000.
The NALS projection of need was based upon the following premises:
(1) Domestic demands for agricultural products will rise with population
growth and increases in per capita consumption. Demand will increase
by one percent a year during the 1980s and 0.9 percent per year during
the 1990s with about two-thirds of the growth attributable to population
increases. (2) Use of corn for gasohol will require seven to 11 million
additional acres by 1990. (3) Agricultural exports may rise to 140 to 250
percent above the 1980 export volumes, with the most likely increase
about 200 percent, or triple present volumes, given constant real prices .8
ULI concedes that the projection of domestic demand for farm products
is consistent with predictions of the Department of Agriculture, but questions whether gasohol production will develop as predicted, or whether
agricultural exports will increase to about triple the present volume.
Although it may not be possible to predict with any accuracy the
8. NALS Report, supra note 1, at 29.
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relationship of the supply of farmland and the demand for farm products
in the year 2000, the over-supply of many farm products during the years
1981 and 1983 is a matter of record and has caused serious problems for
farmers, foreign policy, and the American taxpayer. The overproduction
of farm products that has accumulated in storage facilities in the country
is staggering! In 1982 there was in storage 135 million bushels of wheat,
216 million bushels of corn and over 2.4 billion pounds of butter, cheese
and milk. 9 The surplus milk products are stored in 500 government-owned
warehouses and storage facilities including five large caves near Kansas
City, Missouri.'" To reduce the huge costs of storage, the government
has had to give away millions of pounds of cheese and butter to needy
Americans. In spite of these efforts, the surplus continues to grow because
of the government program to buy all surplus dairy products, without
limit, at $13.10 per hundred pounds of milk. The United States government also guarantees wheat farmers a minimum price of $4.05 a bushel
even through the market price is substantially less, e.g., $3.57 a bushel
in August, 1982. The immense quantities of wheat, corn, barley, soy
beans, sugar, and dairy products in storage and the prospects for better
than usual current crop yields force the market price for these commodities
to fall below farmers' real production costs." For example, wheat that
costs $6.32 a bushel to produce can be bought on the commodity market
for $3.41.2
The NALS offers recommendations to cope with the projected under
supply of farm products in the future. However, in the 1980s the crisis
in agriculture will be how to cope with the current over supply while
waiting for world population to increase and for someone to devise a
method of financing its sale to hungry people of the world without bankrupting the nation or forcing American farmers out of business. 13The
two standard programs designed to meet the problem of agricultural oversupply are: (1) reduce the supply of farm products by curbing production, and (2) increase the demand for farm products by foreign export.
Efforts to curb agricultural production have been taken by both Democratic and Republican administrations. In January 1982, the Reagan
administration announced a program which would require farmers to idle
15 percent of wheat acreage and 10 percent of corn acreage to be eligible
for various federal subsidy programs.' 4 However, past experience indi9. U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 23, 1982, at 65.
10. Id.
11. Kindel & Saunders, Please Come Back, W.J. Bryan, Forbes, Aug. 30, 1982, at 109.
12. Id.
13. See King, Experts See No Way To Treat An Old Problem, N.Y. Times, Aug. f4, 1982, at
8E.
14. Maidenberg, Commodities: Soviet Able To Dictate GrainPrice, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1982,
at D5.
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cates that farmers frequently comply with this condition by taking their
least fertile land out of production and by using additional fertilizer to
maximize production on their most fertile land.' 5
Programs to reduce the agricultural surpluses by increasing exports to
foreign nations involve serious problems of international relations and
trade. The three major purchasers of farm products are the Soviet Union,
China and India. America's principal competitors for the sale of agricultural products on the world market are Argentina (grain, soybeans,
beef), Brazil (bean oil and meal), Canada (wheat and barley), Australia
(grains) and the Common Market countries (dairy products and grains).
There is potential competition with grain products from South America
and southern Africa as more land is directed to agricultural use. In 1979
President Carter imposed an embargo on exports to the Soviet Union
because of their military intervention in Afghanistan. By the time President Reagan lifted this embargo in 1981, the Soviet Union had entered
into long term contracts to buy grain and soybeans from Argentina, and
bean oil and meal from Brazil.' 6 The problem is complicated by the fact
that most nations subsidize their farmers and encourage agricultural production for reasons of national self sufficiency and world trade balances.
In addition, Canada, Australia, Argentina and the Common Market countries pay their farmers an export bonus of up to $80.00 per ton of wheat
that is exported. This wheat is so heavily subsidized that wheat in other
countries such as Chile cannot be sold in competition with Common
Market countries' wheat. " The fact that our allies in foreign relations are
our principal competitors for sales to nations that have been international
adversaries makes efforts by the United States to increase agricultural
exports complicated by serious foreign policy implications.
In spite of the current problems of international competition for the
sale of agricultural products and the current oversupply in the United
States and many of its allies, demographic trends indicate that world
population growth will create a need for an increased supply in the future.
The Urban Land Institute believes that notwithstanding the current oversupply, concerns for preservation of agricultural land to meet future
needs may lead to unnecessary constraints on the supply of land for urban
growth and development. It is their position that the needs for agricultural
land should be balanced with land needs for the nation's growing economy
and population. To achieve these objectives, the Urban Land Institute
(ULI) has made the following recommendations as a counter-proposal to
the recommendation of the NALS:
15. Kindel & Saunders, supra note 11, at 114.
16. Maidenberg, supra note 14.
17. Kindel & Saunders, supra note 11, at 111.
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* Sensible management of the nation's land resources calls for the
retention of prime farmlands in agricultural use, provided that
alternative land suitable for urban development is available at a
reasonable cost and location to satisfy demands for population and
economic growth.
" The purpose of prime farmland protection should be to provide a
base for a functional, viable, agricultural economy; protection of
land to meet recreational or environmental goals should be identified and addressed under separate policies and programs.
* To conserve and improve existing lands in agricultural use, the
Department of Agriculture and allied federal and state agencies
should intensify efforts to reduce soil erosion and other forms of
soil degradation, increase research to raise crop yields and define
economic farming systems, and revise programs which encourage
scattered rural development in prime farmland areas.
" Agricultural lands on which unique or specialty crops are grown
should be discouraged from conversion to other uses only if the
particular crops are truly significant, if no other suitable land is
available for production of the crops, and if produce of similar
quality cannot be imported at a reasonable price.
* Federal policy toward the farmland preservation issue should focus
on establishing appropriate definitions and reliable information to
guide state and local action, and should avoid statements of federal
policy which leave too much room for misinterpretation and excessive regulation.18
An analysis of the NALS and the ULI positions leads to the conclusion
that whether or not the need for agricultural preservation is characterized
as a "crisis" is not important. What is important is the realization that
good agricultural land is a finite resource that must be preserved where
necessary to protect our domestic supply of food and fiber and one of
the few remaining assets in our international balance of payments, as
well as an altruistic concern for an increased food supply to meet the
needs of a growing world population.
Many governmental programs have been devised, in response to these
concerns, to preserve agricultural lands and encourage the continuation
of farming. To achieve these objectives, the government programs must
seek to overcome the reasons why farmers discontinue farming operations.
The usual reasons why a farmer sells his land are: (1) general dissatisfaction because of insufficient net income, local opposition, and limitations of opportunity for the diversity of experience available in urban
areas; (2) a desire to retire, and no family member willing and able to
18. Policy Statement, supra note 7.
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continue to work the farm; and (3) an opportunity to sell the land for a
price that he cannot refuse. Many farmers become dissatisfied because
of insufficient net income from farming operations. The modem farmer
is at the mercy of many natural and governmental forces beyond his
control. The farmer has traditionally accepted the dangers of the vicissitudes of nature such as droughts, floods, and insects. However, today
the farmer must also accept the uncertainties of federal price supports
and international trade agreements, high interest rates, shortages and high
costs of fuel and increased taxation.
It is possible for governmental programs to respond to some, but not
to all, of these causes of farmer discontent. Local government may seek
to protect agricultural land use against opposition of neighbors who object
to the use of fertilizer, pesticides and to the sounds and smells of some
farming activities; state government may reduce property and inheritance
taxes on farms and withhold highways and utilities that encourage development in agricultural areas; the federal government can provide price
supports, foreign trade agreements and income tax advantages. But no
government can provide a farmer with an heir willing and able to take
over the farm or provide the diversity of opportunity and experience more
readily available in urban areas. Consequently, government programs to
preserve farmland can help, but are unlikely to prevent a continuing loss
of farmland to the pressures of development, death, disability and retirement, the attraction of alternative life styles, and the temptations of
a large bundle of cash for the old family farm.
Nevertheless, most states have adopted programs to preserve agricultural lands and to encourage farmers to continue to farm their land. These
programs include (1) land use regulations that restrict the use of land to
agricultural purposes and/or protect the right to use land for farming
activities in spite of nuisance objections of nearby residents; (2) tax laws
that offer tax advantages for farm use and tax disadvantages for conversion
of farm land to other uses; (3) the use of the eminent domain power to
either purchase farmland outright for sale or lease to other farmers or
purchase the right to develop the land, leaving the farmer with only the
right to use the land for agricultural purposes; (4) the transfer of development rights proposal by which the right to develop designated farmland
is prohibited and the farmer is compensated for this loss by his ability to
sell his development rights to developers who use the purchased development rights to increase the density of development on other land designated in the master plan and (5) the withholding of water, sewer and
other infrastructure facilities in areas that would endanger continued agricultural use.
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LAND USE REGULATION
Land use restrictions, usually in the form of zoning and subdivision
laws, have become an accepted form of regulation by local government.
The ability of an owner of agricultural land to use his property for farming,
as well as his ability to convert from farming to other uses, is regulated
by local zoning ordinances. The process by which an owner of agricultural
land may subdivide his land into two or more parcels for sale or redevelopment is regulated by subdivision ordinances. The validity of those
ordinances, in general, will depend upon whether the local regulation is
authorized by the state enabling legislation and whether the regulation
violates any state or federal constitutional or statutory limitation. ' 9
AgriculturalZoning
Agricultural zoning is the most frequently used form of land use restriction of farmland. California, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Minnesota
authorize the adoption of ordinances that restrict a very substantial proportion of the land in those states to agricultural use. Other states, including Iowa, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Maryland also authorize
restrictions to agricultural use. There are two different forms of agricultural zoning, each of which raises different legal issues: (1) nonexclusive
agricultural use ordinances and (2) exclusive agricultural use ordinances.
The nonexclusive ordinance authorizes agricultural uses in the zoning
district but does not prohibit nonfarm uses. Instead, such ordinances
discourage nonfarm uses by such restrictions as large lot zoning and
conditional use application procedures. The large lot minimum size requirement may range from 10 acres to as much as 640 acres for a single
family house. 20 The conditional use provision requires the owner to apply
to a zoning or planning agency and provide evidence that the proposed
nonfarm use is compatible with the surrounding agricultural uses. The
validity of the nonexclusive agricultural ordinance will be relatively easier
to sustain where the limitations on nonagricultural uses are not arbitrary
or unreasonable.
The validity of the exclusive zoning ordinance is more difficult to
sustain because nonagricultural uses are prohibited in such ordinances.
The owner's use of his land is more restricted and the validity of the
ordinance will depend upon a judicial weighing of the public purpose to
be achieved as compared to the confiscatory impact of the regulation upon
the owner's reasonable use of the property. A court will usually indicate
19. For an excellent general discussion of the subject, see Keene, AgriculturalLand Presenation:
Legal and ConstitutionalIssues, 15 GONZ. L. REV. 621 (1980).
20. For an analysis of various types of agricultural zoning ordinances, see Coughlin & Keene,
The Protection of Farmland:An Analysis of Various State and Local Approaches, LAND USE LAW
& ZONING DIGEST (June, 1981).
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its deference to the legislative policy decision when it evaluates these
factors. Exclusive agricultural zones are adopted because of evidence that
they tend to be more effective in preserving agricultural lands than are
nonexclusive ordinances. There is evidence that in communities where
exclusive agricultural zones are adopted, speculation for nonagricultural
uses shifts from agricultural areas to the areas designated for development
purposes and subdivision of agricultural lands is significantly decreased. 2
Experience with agricultural zoning also indicates that large lot zoning
ordinances may provide only temporary protecttion against nonagricultural development but are not effective where they permit non-farm uses
as of right.
When challenged in court the validity of agricultural zoning ordinances
has depended upon the reasonableness of the ordinance as applied to the
22
particular property in issue. For example, in Gisler v. County of Madera,
an exclusive agricultural zoning ordinance with a minimum 18 acre parcel
size was challenged. The property had been used for agricultural purposes
for many years. The court upheld the ordinance as applied to this property.
In Wilson v. County of McHenry,2 3 the agricultural zoning was upheld
even though residential development was located on land adjacent to the
subject property and there was persuasive evidence that the property has
a significantly lower market value as agricultural land than it would have
if residential use were permitted. The court said that the concededly lower
value of the property for agricultural use alone is insufficient to overcome
the presumption of validity of the ordinance. On the other hand, in KMIEC
v. Town of Spider Lake,24 the court held invalid a zoning ordinance that
limited plaintiff's land to agricultural use where the land had not been
used for farm purposes for eleven years and where an expenditure of
approximately $200 per acre would be required to restore the land to
farming condition after which it would have a market value of only $75.00
per acre.
An analysis of the cases on zoning seems to indicate that exclusive
agricultural zoning will usually be upheld in areas where there is little
development pressure. However, the validity becomes more vulnerable
as development in the area makes the classification of the property more
questionable and the restriction in use more unreasonable. Thus, the
effectiveness of agricultural zoning diminishes significantly just at the
point it is needed most, i.e. when the community becomes subject to
development pressures. For this reason, other programs have been used
to preserve agricultural lands.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 6.
Gisler v. County of Madera, 38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974).
Wilson v. County of McHenry, 92 Il1. App. 3d 997, 416 N.E.2d 426 (1981).
KMIEC v. Town of Spider Lake, 60 Wis. 2d 640, 211 N.W.2d 471 (1973).
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Right to Farm Legislation
As residential developments intrude into agricultural areas, it is not
unusual for the newcomers to object to the sounds, smells, noises, and
other characteristics of farming activities. Law suits against farmers,
based on the nuisance principle and local ordinances, limit farming activities, harass farmers, and make it difficult for them to continue. The
legislatures in several states, including New York, California, Illinois,
Maryland, and Virginia, have provided some protection by enacting legislation that prohibits local governments from adopting ordinances that
unreasonably limit farming activities. Some of these laws have only
limited effectiveness where a municipality takes the position that its ordinance is necessary to protect the health and safety of its residents.
Ordinances restricting the use of pesticides, excessive use of fertilizers,
and aerial spraying are illustrations of anti-farm ordinances that come
into conflict with right-to-farm legislation.
Agricultural Districts
Agricultural districts are geographic areas designated and created by
farmers under a procedure prescribed by statute for the purpose of protecting farming against forces that would make farming undesirable, unprofitable or impractical. Several states, including New York, Virginia,
California, Maryland, Minnesota, and New Jersey have authorized the
voluntary creation of such districts.'
The statutes prescribe a procedure by which one or more farmers within
a minimum land area, usually 500 acres, apply for an official designation
of the area as an agricultural district. The statute may prescribe standards
to assure that the land proposed for the district has the physical and soil
characteristics to sustain farming and is not in an area already affected
by intense development pressures.
It may be fair to characterize agricultural district legislation as a form
of state approval of the creation of organizations for the purpose of
maintaining the status quo and opposing changes in farm areas. The
functions of agricultural districts may provide the best basis for their
characterization:
0 Oppose anti-farming ordinances: The state statute may protect

land in agricultural districts from municipal anti-fanning nuisance
suits. If the statute does not offer such protection, the agricultural
district may become the focal point for opposition to municipal
anti-farm ordinances.
25. See Myers, The LegalApsects ofAgriculturalDistricting,IND. L.J. 1 (1979); NALS, supra
note 1, at 76; Middlesex Somerset Mercer Regional Study Council, Inc., Agriculture Retention and
Development Policies For New Jersey 63 (N.J. Dept. of Agriculture, 1980).
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* Oppose highways, water and sewer investments by government:

Highway, water, and sewer improvements encourage development
of the land. On the other hand, farmers are also real estate investors
who do not object to having their primary capital investment increase in value.
* Oppose government acquisitionoffarmlandfor nonfarmpurposes:

The agricultural district can provide the focus for opposition to
government acquisitions for parks, prisons, hospitals, sewage
treatment plants, and all other government activities that diminish
agricultural use of the land.
* Oppose special assessmentsfor nonfarm purposes: Farmers are

particularly aroused when roads, sewers, and other improvements
are paid for by special assessments against their land but do not
benefit their farming activities.
* Oppose residential,commercial and other nonagriculturalzoning

and development: Urbanization is a gradual process. Agricultural
activities become difficult to maintain once a point is reached when
the area is no longer rural-agricultural. An agricultural district can
direct its political forces against nonagricultural zoning and development. Once the residential and commercial activities are
established, the opposing political forces may become overwhelming.
* Oppose annexation by neighboring municipalities: One of the

techniques of municipal growth is annexation of land at its borders.
Agricultural districts can be used to oppose such annexation where
prime agricultural lands are involved.2"
The effectiveness of agricultural districts as a technique for the preservation of farmland remains to be evaluated. However, the existence of
an active agricultural district organization in an area is a factor that cannot
be ignored by developers or government officials.
TAX INCENTIVES
In an earlier discussion, attention was directed to the fact that instifficient net income is one of the causes of general dissatisfaction that leads
some farmers to discontinue farming. To the extent that a farmer's tax
burden can be lessened, his economic condition may be improved to help
him earn a reasonable living. Federal income tax and estate taxes have
an important effect upon a farmer's financial position and will be discussed
later in this section. The other tax burden that has a major effect upon a
farmer's net income is the yearly obligation to pay property taxes.
26. For an analysis of the elements of agricultural district programs under six state statutues, see
NALS, supra note 1, at 78.
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Property Taxes
Property taxes, collected by municipal and county governments and
school districts, are based upon the market value of the property, i.e. the
higher the property value, the higher the property tax. Thus, as the
development potential of farmland increases, the value of the land increases and so does the property tax. Consequently, rising property taxes
tend to increase the farmer's incentive to sell his land at the very time
that there is an increased market demand and opportunity to sell that land
for development purposes.
Forty seven states have adopted legislation designed to lower farmer's
property taxes by calculating their tax liability on the lower agricultural
value rather than the market value of the land that would include its value
for development purposes.27 Such laws are known as "preferential" or
"differential" farmland assessment laws. The New Jersey and California
laws provide good illustrations of some of the legal problems that arise
from these laws.
When New Jersey adopted its first preferential farmland assessment
law it faced the same problem that arises in most states whose constitution
contains a uniformity clause. This typical state constitutional provision
requires property taxes to be levied uniformly, based upon fair market
value. Preferential farmland assessment laws do not tax property uniformly; instead they permit agricultural lands to be evaluated differently
from other real property by assessing agricultural land at its lower agricultural value without including its development value. In New Jersey
and other states the courts have held that preferential farmland assessment
laws violate the uniformity clause of the state constitution.2" To overcome
this problem, New Jersey and many other states have amended the state
constitution to specifically authorize preferential assessments for farmland
property."
Administration of a preferential assessment statute creates several problems. One issue that frequently arises is whether the owner is entitled to
the lower assessment on his entire parcel of land even though only a
portion is actually farmed. In Township of Andover v. Kymer,3 ° the court
held that the preferential assessment is not limited to fertile and productive
land but includes woodlands, wet areas, and other appurtenant land of
only marginal agricultural value. The decision also noted that an owner
27. For an analysis of the variety of property tax relief programs see, Dunford, A Survey of
Property Tax Relief Programsfor the Retention of Agriculturaland Open Space Lands, 15 GONZ.
L. REV. 676 (1980).
28. Switz v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 566, 182 A.2d 841 (1962). However, the Illinois court has upheld
its validity., Hoffman v. Clark, 69 Ill. 2d 402, 372 N.E.2d 74 (1977).
29. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 1, para 1.
30. Township of Andover v. Kymer, 140 N.J. Super. 399, 356 A.2d 418 (App. Div. 1976).
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is not made ineligible under the law if his objectives include speculative
as well as agricultural purposes.
Another problem in the administration of preferential assessments statutes involves the method of determining the agricultural value of the
property. In New Jersey a Farmland Evaluation Advisory Committee is
established to recommend ranges of farmland values for various farmland
uses. However, the recommendation of the Committee is not conclusive
and evidence relating to the particular parcel is to be considered. 3'
Most farmland assessment laws contain a provision that limits eligibility
for the tax advantage to property that will benefit farmers rather than
speculators. The usual provision to attain this objective is a requirement
relating to agricultural income. For example, in New Jersey it must be
shown that the property produced sales of agricultural products of at least
$500.00 for each of two years prior to the tax year in issue.3 2 In Alaska,
there is a requirement that 25 percent of the family income be derived
from farming operations.33 In Utah, the property must produce at least
$250 per acre per year or the owner must derive at least 80 percent of
his income from the property.34
The roll back provision is a complex and frequently litigated provision
of preferential assessment laws. This provision is designed to discourage
conversions of farmland and to shift the tax burden back to owners of
farm property that is converted to nonagricultural use. The roll back
provision in New Jersey is typical. It provides that when the property is
no longer used for farmland purposes, the owner must pay the amount
of the tax benefit that had previously attached to the property for the
previous three years.35 This provision makes it necessary for buyers and
sellers of farmland to agree upon who is to make payment under the roll
back provision. In the absence of agreement to the contrary, a New Jersey
court has held that the purchaser who converts the land from agricultural
use is responsible for the roll back taxes. 36
The legislatures of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire
have sought to achieve the same objective of the roll back provision by
imposing a conveyance tax on land that has received the benefit of a
31. For a critical analysis of the various methods of evaluating farmland, see Currier, AnAnalysis
of Differential Taxation As A Method of MaintainingAgricultural and Open Space Land Uses, 30
U. FLA. L. REV. 821 (1978).
32. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:4-23.2 to 23.5 (West. Supp. 1983-84).
33. ALASKA STAT. §29.53.035(c) (1972).
34. UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-5-89 (Supp. 1983).
35. N.J. STAT. ANN. §54:4-23.8 (West Supp. 1983-84).
36. Paz v. DeSimone, 139 N.J. Super. 102, 352 A.2d 609 (Ch. Div. 1976). This decision contains
a critical analysis of the roll back provision and its limited effectiveness in attaining its stated
objectives.
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farmland preferential assessment.37 A tax of 10 percent is imposed on the
sale price of land sold after less than one year after receiving the benefit
of the preferential assessment. The tax is decreased by one percent for
each year that is kept in agricultural use. This law was challenged as a
violation of the equal protection clause because, it was argued, the declining tax rate did not bear a reasonable relationship to the goal of
preserving open space. A Connecticut court upheld the law upon a finding
that the deterrence of frequent changes of ownership of eligible property
constituted a reasonable basis for treating shorter and longer term ownership differently.38
California has one of the oldest and most widely used farmland preferential assessment laws. Under the Williamson Act,39 adopted in 1965,
local governments are authorized to designate areas as agricultural preserves and to offer owners of land therein a contractual agreement to tax
the land at its agricultural use value in return for the owner's agreement
to restrict the land to open-space use. The agreements are made for a
period of 10 years and renew automatically each year unless notice of
nonrenewal is given. Thus the contract is renewed for an additional 10
years, at the end of each year, unless notice of non-renewal is given. If
such notice is given, the taxes begin to increase progressively each year
until the end of the tenth year, at which time property taxation will be
based upon the market value of the property. The parties may cancel the
contract upon approval of the city or county, and upon the payment of a
cancellation fee equal to 12.5 percent of the fair market value of the land.
In the first ten years of the program, from 1965 to 1976, over 14 million
acres of land were enrolled. This amount includes about 30 percent of
privately owned land in the state and about one-half of all agricultural
land.' However, it has been suggested that almost all of this land is rural
and not under development pressure. Consequently, it is argued that the
California farm preferential tax law does not protect the farmland it was
intended to benefit, i.e. farmland under development pressure, but instead
benefits only those farmers who do not intend to develop in the near
future anyway.4 1 Nevertheless, the Williamson law does perform a useful
function by creating agricultural districts within which all participants in
the program may protest the cancellation of the contract in which the
37. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-504a.
38. Curry v. Planning & Zoning Com'n, 34 Conn. Supp. 52, 376 A.2d 79 (1977). See also,
Keene, supra note 19, at 660.
39. CAL. GOV'T. CODE§§ 51200-51295 (West 1983 & Supp. 1984).
40. Dawson, Compassionate Taxation of Undeveloped PrivateLands, 3 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW REPORT 49, 52 (July-August, 1980); See J. KEENE, UNTAXING OPEN SPACE
(Regional Science Research Inst. 1976).
41. Dawson, supra note 40, at 52; Hansen & Schwarta, PrimeLand Conservation:The California
Land ConservationAct, J. OF LAND AND WATER CONSERVATION 198, 202 (1976).
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landowner agrees to restrict the land to open space use for an annually
renewable ten year period.
The importance of this provision arose in Sierra Club v. City of Haywood,42 where an owner of farmland sought to cancel the contract made
under the Williamson Act. The law permits such cancellation with approval of the city after making specified findings. The city made the
required findings and cancelled the contract. On appeal, the court reversed
and held that the city's findings were not supported by the evidence in
light of the purposes of the Williamson Act. The court said that to allow
an abrupt cancellation of the open space preservation contract there must
be substantial evidence in the record to demonstrate that continued compliance would interfere with orderly development; that awaiting normal
termination of the contract would fail to serve the purposes of the Act;
and the interest in preservation of open space land and orderly development of urban areas are substantially outweighed by other public concerns.
The effectiveness of preferential farmland tax assessment laws is the
subject of continuing debate. Critics of the program have argued that tax
relief programs can be effective at best only where the farmer's decision
to sell is based on limited farm income and reduction of property taxes
makes a significant difference in his net income. They ague that tax
relief will not have much effect where the reason for the farmer's sale
or conversion to nonfarm use is based upon: (1) sickness, retirement, or
death; (2) absence of a family member to continue the farm; (3) encroachment of residential or other conflicting land uses; or (4) a desire
to move to a more rural area. Some critics go even further and recommend
the repeal of farmland preferential assessment laws because: (1) the tax
burden of reduced taxation of farmers falls on nonfarm residents of the
municipality, many of whom have no special advantages from the program
or ability to pay the higher taxes; (2) land speculators are the primary
beneficiaries because of their ability to secure the benefits of the tax laws
by a minimal agricultural use or by leasing the property to tenant farmers;
(3) the roll back provisions result in a disadvantage to the farmer rather
than the land developer because the back taxes payable thereunder are
considered in setting the sales price for the land.43
Estate and InheritanceTaxes
One of the critical milestones in the cycle of farmland ownership arrives
42. Sierra Club v. City of Haywood, 28 C.3d 840, 623 P.2d 180, 171 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1981).
43. For an excellent critical analysis of this subject, see Kolesar & Scholl, Misplaced Hopes,
Misspent Millions: A Report On Farmland Assessment in New Jersey (Center for the Analysis of
Public Issues, 1972); see also Currier, AnAnalysis ofDifferentialTaxationas a Method of Maintaining
Agriculturaland Open Space Land Uses, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 821 (1978).
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when the farmer dies. Even where there is an heir willing and able to
continue the operation, if a disproportionate amount of the estate must
be used to pay estate or inheritance taxes, the feasibility of maintaining
the farm will be severely diminished. Both the federal government, in
its estate tax, and the state governments, in their inheritance taxes, have
softened the impact of these tax laws by reducing the tax burden of passing
farm property from one generation to the next.
FederalEstate Tax. There are two methods by which the federal estate
tax on farmland has been reduced: (1) increasing the amount exempt from
estate taxation and (2) evaluating farm property at its agricultural value
rather than at its "highest and best use." Reducing estate taxation applies
to all estates, but is especially useful to family-farm estates. Under the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, taxation of gifts was combined with estate
taxation into a new Unified Estate and Gift Tax. Under the 1976 law, the
tax applies to the sum of all taxable gifts made during one's lifetime,
plus the taxable estate at death. This combined total is not subject to
federal taxation until it exceeds $175,000 in 1983 with the limit raised
by about 20% each year until it reaches $600,000 in 1987. Thus, by
1987, a farmer will be able to leave an estate (including lifetime gifts)
of about $10,000 per year per donor up to $600,000 without any federal
estate tax payable. In addition, there is an unlimited marital deduction
where the entire estate is left to one's spouse. This means that there is
no tax payable when a farmer dies and leaves the farm to his/her spouse
and there will be no tax on the first $275,000 to $600,000 (between now
and 1987) when the survivor dies.
In addition, under Section 2032A of the Internal Revenue Code, an
executor may elect to value the farm at its agricultural use value under
the following circumstances:
1. the decedent was a citizen or resident of the United States at the
time of his death;
2. the value of the farm reduced by the mortgage constitutes at least
50 percent of the adjusted gross estate;
3. at least 25 percent of the adjusted value of the gross estate consists
of qualified farm property;
4. the real property qualifying for agricultural use valuation will pass
to a qualified heir, i.e. a member of the family or a defined close
relative;
5. the real property was owned by the decedent or a member of his
family and used as a farm for five of the eight years immediately
prior to his death, and
6. the decedent or a member of his family took an active part in the
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operation of the farm for at least five of the eight years immediately preceding his death. 44
One commentator has observed that the primary beneficiaries of this
provision are farmers with estates with a fair market value of over
$1,000,000.4 There is also a provision for the recapture of taxes if the
property is not kept in agricultural use for the specified period of time.
It has been argued that this provision discourages the sale of farmland
that has received the benefits of estate tax law, and limits the availability
of farmland to beginning farmers. 46 The Tax Reform Act of 1976 limited
the amount of the reduction of a farmland estate to $500,000. This limit
was raised to $750,000 in section 421 of the Economic Recovery Act of
1981. 47
State Inheritance Taxes. A decedent's estate may be subject to taxation
by state government (usually called inheritance taxes) as well as federal
estate taxes. The state inheritance tax is substantially less than the federal
estate tax and may very with the relationship of the beneficiary. For
example, in New Jersey if the beneficiary is a father, mother, grandparent,
husband, wife, or child an estate of $500,000 will pay a maximum rate
of 7 percent and the maximum rate for estates over $3,200,000 is 16
percent. The rate is somewhat higher if the beneficiary is a brother or
sister or their widow or widower. If the beneficiary is not one of those
close relatives the tax is 15 percent on any amount up to $700,000 and
16% on any amount in excess of $700,000. 4 1 In addition, the state inheritance tax may provide for an exclusion that may be of special benefit
to farmers. For example the New Jersey law does not levy an inheritance
tax on real property held as tenant by the entireties, i.e., in the name of
husband and wife with the understanding that the survivor automatically
become the sole owner upon the death of the marital partner.4 9 Many
state inheritance tax laws also provide for evaluation of farm estates at
lower agricultural value. This may be accomplished either by adopting
the federal definition of a taxable estate and thereby adopting the I.R.C.
Sec. 2032A method of agricultural use evaluation, or having specific
statutes that permit the lower evaluation of farm property.5"
44. I.R.C. §2032A (1983).
45. Keene, supra note 19, at 663.
46. Dyer, Estate Tax Savings and the Family Farm:A CriticalAnalysis of Section 2032A of the
Internal Revenue Code, II U.C. D. L. REV. 81 (1978).
47. For an analysis of the effect of the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 on land use see, Jaffee,
Land Use and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, LAND USE LAW & ZONING DIGEST 5
(Nov. 1981).
48. N.J. STAT. ANN. §54:34-2 (West Supp. 1983-84).
49. N.J.A.C. § 18:26-6.4(a).
50. For additional information see Keene, supra note 19, at 665.
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GOVERNMENT ACQUISITION OF FARMLAND
The problem of farmland preservation exists because farmers sell their
land to private owners who, for personal profit, convert that land to nonagricultural uses irrespective of an arguable local, national, or international need for the farm products formerly produced on that land. The
prior discussion has described the limits of success of other government
programs, such as land use regulation and tax incentives to halt this
process. As long as farmland is owned by private persons, there is a risk
that the owner will pursue his own economic advantage and sell good
farmland for development purposes when the price is right.
One method of avoiding the conversion of prime farmland by private
owners is for government to acquire the land and limit its use to agriculture. Advocates of this technique argue that government has a responsibility to prevent a steady loss of farmland and should exercise its
power of eminent domain, i.e. purchase the land and thereby eliminate
the temptation of personal gain that motivates most conversions. Proposals
for government acquisition of farmland have taken two forms: (1) acquisition of thefull title to the land and (2) acquisition of the development
rights only.
Acquisition of the Full Title: Land Banking
The acquisition of privately owned farmland by a government agency
can prevent that land from being converted to nonfarm use. As farmland
is acquired, it becomes possible to combine some land with other contiguous or nearby parcels to improve the economic feasibility of the
farming operation. Such a process raises the legal and policy issues of
land banking. The term, "land banking," is used to describe the program
by which land is acquired by government and held in reserve for the
purpose of achieving designated planning objectives. For example, the
National Commission on Urban Problems has recommended land banking
programs for the purposes of: (1) controlling the timing, location, type
and scale of future development; (2) assuring the continuing availability
of sites for development; (3) reserving to the public the increment in
value of land resulting from government services and inflation, and (4)
preventing urban sprawl."
The NALS also recommends land banking, but for the purpose of
purchasing extensive areas of rural land at rural use values, designating
some of it, such as prime farmland, for permanent resource use, selling
or leasing it with restrictions on use, and selling or leasing other areas
for urban development. Under the NALS proposal, the public acts as a
51. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY
251 (1968).
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large-scale real estate developer that acquires the land, determines its best
future use, and sells it with restrictions that prohibit development on
prime farmland. 2
In spite of the obvious advantages of land banking, there are serious
financial and fiscal problems, and unresolved legal issues. The financial
problem is self evident: the program requires substantial funding for long
periods of time. During periods of fiscal constraint the monies used for
land banking must be diverted from other worthwhile programs. In addition, during the period of time that government owns the land it is
removed from the tax rolls, and other property owners in the taxing district
must bear the burden of additional taxation or be satisfied with the reduced
services available from reduced revenue.
Furthermore, the constitutionality of land banking programs in the
United States is still in doubt. In the one judicial decision directly on the
subject, Commonwealth v. Rosso,53 the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico
upheld the Puerto Rican land banking program and found that there was
a sufficient "public use" to justify the taking. The public use was described
in terms of the social benefit and common good to be derived from the
program. In spite of the paucity of decisions on this issue, the American
Law Institute (ALI) has included land banking as a major provision of
the Model Land Development Code.54 Section 6 of the Code describes
the powers of an implementing agency, including the power to acquire
and dispose of land and the requirement of the adoption of a land reserve
policy consistent with the state development plan. Land banking has been
used in other countries, such as France, Sweden, and Denmark. However,
the Puerto Rican land bank system is the only full-scale American experience with the system. 5
The versatility of the land banking system can be appreciated by the
fact that it may be used not only for preservation of farmland in the path
of urban development, but can also be used as a technique to avoid the
enormous costs of price supports and storage of excess farm products
during periods of oversupply. It has been proposed that during periods
when supply of agricultural products exceeds demand, government should
buy surplus farmland and hold it in a land bank. When prices fall because
of oversupply, the land in the land bank will not be used. Farmers will
not be able to overproduce in an effort to overcome the problems of low
52. NALS, supra note 1, at 170-71.
53. Commonwealth v. Rosso, 95 P.R. 488 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 14 (1968).
54. American Law Institute, MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 6 (1975).
55. For additional information about land banking see, A. STRONG, LAND BANKING: EUROPEAN REALITY, AMERICAN PROSPECT (1979); Note, PublicLand Banking:A New Praxis
For Urban Growth, 23 CASE W. RES 897 (1972); Fitch & Mack, Land Banking, in Harris, THE
GOOD EARTH OF AMERICA 134 (Harris ed. 1974).
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prices and high personal debt. On the other hand, when the demand or
national need for farm products is high, the government can rent land
back to farmers who own contiguous or nearby property, at a relatively
low rental price that would encourage that land to be used.56
If a land banking system is adopted, a government agency would, in
theory at least, have three possible ways of dealing with the land: (1) it
could operate the farm with government employees; (2) the land could
be leased for farm use; (3) the land could be sold to a private person with
a deed restriction or other agreement that restricts the land to farm use.
Each technique has it own advantages and disadvantages.
The operation of a farm on government-owned land by government
employees would raise serious political objections. As long as the nation
is committed to a system of private enterprise, every proposal for an
inroad into private entrepreneurial activities by government can be expected to face stiff opposition in the legislatures. Even though a precedent
has been established by such colossal government enterprises as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey, the political feasibility of establishing government-owned and
managed farms in the United States in the 1980s appears very slim.
In addition to the limited political feasibility of government-operated
farms because of its socialistic implications, the acquisition of farmland
would be opposed because of fears of government corruption, graft,
logrolling, and political favors that the American public tends to associate
with government-operated business activities. Furthermore, farmers and
other owners of real estate in the same taxing jurisdiction can be expected
to oppose programs of land acquisition by government because the removal of property from the tax rolls usually results in higher taxation
imposed upon the remaining property owners.
The second option of a land banking operation would be to lease the
land for farm use. This method would assure the continuing agricultural
use of the land but would also maintain the public objection to government
ownership of land and removal of the land from the tax rolls except that
the rental income could be contributed in lieu of taxes.
There are several disadvantages to leasing farmland held in a land
bank: (1) The leasing of farmland creates tenant-farmers. This conflicts
with one of the original reasons for farmland preservation, namely, the
preservation of a socially stable, economically independent segment of
society. (2) Without ownership of the property to be used for security,
the tenant-farmer would have difficulty in obtaining bank loans for equipment, seeds, fertilizer, etc. (3) Without a long-term interest in the land,
the tenant farmer would be less likely to utilize the best methods of soil
56. Kindel & Saunders, supra note 11, at 109.
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conservation and maintenance of the physical facilities. (4) When property
is owned by the government and leased to a private individual, it puts
the government agency in the unenviable position of being a landlord in
a relationship that has been characterized as "the second most passionate
relationship" in our society.57
The primary advantage of the leasing method is that land can be removed from production in periods of oversupply and low farm prices.
However, unless the land is leased to contiguous or nearby farmers, when
the land is taken out of production, the tenant would be displaced, outof-work and bitter about his loss of livelihood.
The third option is resale of the land to farmers, with a deed restriction
that limits the use of land to farming operations. This method has the
greatest political feasibility because of the return of the land to private
ownership. Nevertheless, many farmers object to this system because the
purchasers would be deprived of the opportunity for substantial increment
in the value of their farmland as urbanization of the area makes the land
valuable for development purposes. The deed restrictions would prevent
such development. In fact the primary purpose of the acquisition of the
land in the first place is to create the opportunity to impose deed restrictions when the property is resold. The sale price of the land with the deed
restriction will be based upon the limited use for agricultural purposes
and will be relatively inexpensive because ownership does not include
the expectation of increment in value for development purposes.
If the power of eminent domain is used to acquire farmland from one
private owner for the purpose of selling it to another, private owner who
agrees to preserve its agricultural use, care must be taken to avoid the
problems that arose under the Hawaii Land Reform Act. The Act was
intended to overcome the adverse social and economic situation created
by concentrated ownership of residential property in the state resulting
from the policy of large landowners leasing and not selling their land.
The Hawaii Land Reform Act authorized a state agency to condemn
private residential land and then to sell it to the lessees of the property.
In Midkiff v. Tom, 58 the federal court of appeals held the Act unconstitutional because the taking was not for a "public use." The court seemed
concerned about the fact that possession was not transferred to the government, but rather "we see a naked attempt . .. to take the private
59
property of A and transfer it to B solely for B's private use and benefit."
The United States Supreme Court rejected this reasoning and upheld the
57. For an analysis of the problems of the landlord-tenant relationship, see, J. ROSE, LANDLORDS AND TENANTS: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE RESIDENTIAL RENTAL RELATIONSHIP (1973).
58. Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1983).
59. Id. at 798.
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exercise of the eminent domain power. The court said that it will not
substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to what constitutes
"public use" unless the use is palpably without reasonable foundation.
Where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to
a conceivable public purpose, a compensated taking is not prohibited by
the "public use" clause.' It would seem that if the redistribution of fees
simple to reduce the evils of oligopoly is a rational exercise of the eminent
domain power then the acquisition of privately owned farmland to prevent
that land from being converted to nonfarm use may also be upheld as a
valid exercise of the eminent domain power.
Acquisition of the Development Rights
Once it is determined that the primary objective of a land acquisition
program is to resell with a deed restriction limiting the land to agricultural
use, it becomes apparent that the same objective can be achieved without
the expense and disruption of purchasing all of the farmer's legal title to
the land and selling back only a part of the title, without the right to
develop. This same objective can be accomplished more directly by having the government purchase only the farmer's right to develop the land,
leaving him with all other rights to use the land for farming purposes.
Several states have adopted programs of purchase of development rights,
known by the acronym PDR.
The NALS describes ten PDR programs adopted as of November,
1980.61 The Suffolk County, New York program, started in 1974, was
the first attempt to protect farmland by the purchase of development rights.
During a six year period, development rights were purchased for 51
parcels of land with a total of 3,214 acres. The county has authorized
the appraisals for the development rights of
61 additional parcels when
62
funds become available for their purchase.
The New Jersey Demonstration Project was adopted in 1976 as a pilot
project to test the feasibility of the concept. The state legislature provided
funding of $5 million for planning administration and purchase of development rights in Burlington County. After planning and appraisals,
three clusters of parcels in Lumberton Township, Pemberton and Southhampton were recommended for purchase of development rights. However, the program was terminated before any easements were purchased
60. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, U.S.-,
52 L.W. 4673. (1984)
61. Those programs include: Suffolk County, NY; New Jersey Demonstration Project; Maryland;
Massachusetts; Connecticut; Howard County, MD; Burlington County, NJ; King County, WA; New
Hampshire; and the Town of Southampton, NY. NALS, supra note 1, at 148-73.
62. For additional information about the Long Island program, see, Peterson & McCarthy, Farm
Preservationby PurchaseofDevelopment Rights: The Long IslandExperiment, 26 DEPAUL 1. REV.
447 (1977).
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because it appeared that the cost of the program was far in excess of
original estimates of $500 per acre. Farmers wanted $1300 an acre for
their development rights.63 In addition, there was a concern that appraisals
of farm use values used in the pilot program might be used to increase
the assessed values of farmland under the New Jersey Farmland Assessment Act.64
The largest program of purchase of development rights to protect farmland and preserve open space in general has been adopted in King County,
Washington (containing the City of Seattle) where a bond issue of $50
million has been approved by the voters. In recommending this program,
the legislature of the State of Washington found that "the haphazard
growth and spread of urban development is encroaching upon, or eliminating, numerous open areas and spaces of varied size and character,
including many devoted to agriculture, the cultivation of timber, and
other productive activities, and many others having significant recrea65
tional, social, scenic, or esthetic values."

The NALS describes the characteristics that all PDR programs have
incommon:'
0 Voluntary Nature of the Program.All programs were based upon

the voluntary cooperation of the owners of farmland. No program
was authorized to use the power of eminent domain to require the
sale of development rights. A system was established for estimates
of the market value and farm value of the land per acre. The
calculation was based upon the assumption that the development
right value is the difference between market value and farm value.
A purchase of development rights would take place only if the
owner was willing to sell his development rights at this value.
There is an assumption that farmers will offer to sell the development rights to reduce their debts, to purchase additional farm
land, to make farm improvements or to accumulate capital for
retirement. Where the land is owned by land investors who purchased with expectation of developing or selling for development,
there is little expectation that development rights would be offered
on this land. However, in Suffolk County, New York, the real
estate market for undeveloped land collapsed in the 1970's and
land investors offered the rights for sale as the only available
opportunity for retrieving at least a part of their investment.
63. The Star Ledger, Aug. 26, 1979, at 26, § 1.
64. In January, 1983 the New Jersey legislature adopted a series of agriculture preservation bills,
one of which is another program for the purchase of development rights. The Star Ledger, Jan. 27,
1983, at 26, col. 1.
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 84.34.200 (1979). For additional information about the Washington
PDR program see, Comment, Agricultural Land Preservation:Washington's Approach, 15 GONZAGA L. REV. 765 (1980).
66. NALS, supra note 1, at 149.
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* Selection of the Parcels. There are several factors that must be
considered in the selection of parcels whose development rights
are to be purchased. The land must be good agricultural land based
on some objective criteria such as specified soil quality or current
or recent use for commercial agriculture. Under the New Jersey
Demonstration Program, the land must have a soil classification
of Class I, II or III but may be eligible even at a lower soil
classification if used for one of the specialty crops in the state
such as cranberries or blueberries. A second factor to be considered
in the selection of agricultural land is the price per acre. On one
hand, land that is too expensive will require too large a proportion
of the total funding for only limited acreage. On the other hand,
if the land is comparatively inexpensive it would mean that there
is insufficient development pressure in that area to justify its inclusion in the program. A third factor in the selection of eligible
land is contiguity, i.e., the extent to which the parcels are next to
or near other land included in the program. On one hand, there
is a desire to protect clusters of existing farmland in areas of
sufficient size to assure a continuation of the various agricultural
services and facilities on which commercial agricultural activities
depends. On the other hand, there may be political reasons to
avoid the opposition from municipal governments that seek additional development to obtain higher property tax revenues and
therefore object to having too large a share of agricultural lands
in the jurisdiction.
* Development Restrictions. The purpose of the PDR program is to
purchase the farm owner's right to develop the land. This thought
may be expressed in a negative way: The purpose of the program
is to compensate the landowner for the loss of value that would
result from severe development restrictions. Worded in this manner
it becomes clear that the underlying objective is to impose restrictions on development that are so severe that compensation is made
to the owner. The Massachusetts statute prohibits construction of
all buildings except for agricultural purposes or for farm personnel.
It also prohibits excavation, dredging or removal of soil or other
material and also prohibits all other acts or uses of the land that
may be detrimental to agricultural use.67 The Suffolk County and
New Jersey regulations prohibit retail operations except for farm
stands under limited circumstances.
* Repurchase of Development Rights. There is a temptation for ardent supporters of a remedial proposal to try to assure the permanency of their remedy and to try to make certain that the
agricultural lands protected under the PDR program will be preserved in perpetuity. However, planners and lawyers with a sense
67. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 184, §31 (West Supp. 1980).
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of history recognize that perpetuity is a long time and that circumstances may change to make it desirable to permit nonagricultural use of the removal of the development restrictions, usually
by repurchase of development rights by the owner, vary widely.
For example, under the Connecticut program, voter approval in
a local referendum is required. Under the Suffolk County program,
a countywide referendum is needed. In Maryland, there must be
a trial period of at least 25 years after which a resale of development rights may be authorized upon a finding that farming is
not feasible and approval is given by the county governing body,
the state administrative agency, as well as the State Treasurer and
Secretary of Agriculture.
0 Funding Sources. A program of purchase of development rights
can be successful only to the extent that funds can be raised to
pay for acquisition of the rights. Among the funding sources are:
(1) bonding, (2) a real property transfer tax, (3) a land gains tax,
and (4) a tax on the conversion of agricultural land. 8 The sale of
bonds is the usual method by which state and local government
raise money for large capital expenditures. In most states there is
a procedure by which proposals for state bonding requests are
evaluated by a government agency and reported to a legislative
committee with recommendations. In New Jersey, for example,
the state legislature then determines whether to submit the bond
proposal for state-wide referendum. This proposal is next submitted to the governor for his approval, and then placed on the
ballot for approval by the electorate at the next election. The New
Jersey Demonstration Project, created to test the feasibility of
development rights purchase, was financed by the sale of "Greenacres" bonds. There is an unresolved question of the validity of
the use of such funds arising from the fact that the public would
not have access to real estate interests purchased by these funds.
An increase in the real estate transfer tax is often suggested as a source
of funds for the purchase of development rights. A real estate transfer

tax is imposed by most states and is based upon the actual consideration
paid for the property. A documentary stamp in the amount of the tax is
usually required to be affixed to the deed as a condition of recording of
the deed. The New Jersey Blueprint Commission has recommended an
increase in the New Jersey real estate transfer tax as a source of funds
for the purchase of development rights. In its report it was suggested that
this particular tax is especially appropriate because the amount of the
revenue will increase as the value of real estate and the volume of real
68. One of the best analyses of the sources of revenue for purchase of development rights and
other farm preservation programs is contained in Middlesex Somerset Mercer (MSM) Regional Study
Council Inc., Agriculture Retention and Development Policies For New Jersey (1980) (hereinafter
referred to as MSM Study).
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estate transaction increases. Thus, there will be more money available
for the purchase of development rights when development pressures are
greatest and the need for farmland preservation is most urgent.
A third source of revenue for the purchase of development rights may
be found in a "land gains tax." The Vermont capital gains tax,69 for
example, imposes a tax on capital gains from the sale of land. The amount
of the tax is based upon two variables: (1) the period of time held before
sale, e.g., ranging from five percent for five years to 30 percent if owned
less than one year; (2) the amount of gain, as a percentage of cost, e.g.,
ranging from 30 percent for a gain of under 100 percent and held less
than one year to 60 percent for a gain of 200 percent or more and held
less than one year. The purpose of this tax is to control the use of land
and real estate speculation in Vermont. The proceeds of the tax are used
to provide tax relief for property taxes paid in excess of a graduated
percentage of household income.70 It has been suggested that this form
of taxation would be appropriate for funding the purchase of development
rights. 7 '
A fourth source of funding, suggested by the NALS,7 2 is a development
tax on land that is converted from agricultural use after having received
the benefit of a state farmland assessment law. More specifically, a specified percentage of the revenue from the roll back provision of farm
assessment law would be assigned to a fund for the purchase of development rights. Thus, more money would be available for this program
of farm preservation during periods when there is greatest development
pressure and need for funding of the program. The Maryland PDR program is funded by revenue from a tax on land converted from agricultural
use after having received the benefit of the state's Farmland Assessment
Act.73
It may be too early to evaluate the effectiveness of PDR as a method
of preserving farmland. As of the fall of 1980, there were over 10,000
acres of farmland from which the development rights have been purchased
under nine state and county programs. Of this amount, 3200 acres are in
Suffolk Co., New York, 2400 acres of the Maryland program, 1300 acres
in Massachusetts, 2500 acres in Connecticut and 810 acres in Burlington
County, New Jersey, ." However, the experience of the New Jersey Dem69. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 1001-10010 (Supp. 1983).
70. For additional information about the Vermont program, see, Rose, Vermont Uses the Taxing
Power to Control Land Use. 2 REAL EST. L.J. 602 (1973).
71. MSM Study, supra note 68, at 155.
72. NALS, supra note 1, at 155.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 157.
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onstration Project, in which no purchases were made, is that the actual
cost per acre of purchasing development rights is very much higher than
estimated in planning the program and that cost multiplied by the number
of acres of farmland eligible for the program produces a total cost far in
excess of any realistic expectation of funding. In addition, there remains
an unanswered question of whether the program will collapse in the future
when the combined political power of farmers who have sold their development rights seek to "repurchase" those rights to reap the benefits
of future higher market prices for development.
THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
Introduction to the Legal Concept
The transfer of development rights (TDR) is frequently proposed as a
method of preserving farmland without imposing the cost on farmers and
without the unmanageable cost to the public of buying the land or the
development rights with public funds. A transfer of development rights
program would establish a mechanism by which owners of preserved
farmland are compensated for legal restrictions on the use of their land
by selling the right to develop their land to owners of designated "developable" land who could increase the development density by applying
the purchased development rights to that land.
The legal concept underlying the TDR system is that title to real estate
is not a unitary or monolithic right, but rather it may be compared to a
"bundle of individual rights" each one of which may be separated from
the rest and transferred to someone else, leaving the original owner with
all other rights of ownership. This is not a new or novel idea. There are
many illustrations in the law where individual components of title to real
estate are separated from and transferred from the rest of the title. Mineral
rights, air rights, and mortgage liens are well known examples.
One of the components of this bundle of rights known as a "fee simple"
or ownership of the full title to land, is the right to develop the land. In
rural and agricultural areas, where there is little expectation of development in the foreseeable future, the right to develop the land has little
value. In areas in the path of urban development, the development rights
tends to become the component of greatest value among the many rights
of ownership. The transfer of development rights system seeks to separate
the right to development from the other components of title and sell that
right only, leaving the owner of the land with all other rights except the
right to develop.
EarlyAmerican Precedents. There is legal precedent for the separation
and transfer of just that one right. Professor Donald M. Carmichael has
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described the early American precedents upon which TDR is based.7 5 His
article focuses on four ancestors of planning districts which involved the
transfer of development potential of privately owned properties to other
property owners for the purpose of fulfilling a public need. Those precedents are (1) the early transportation systems; (2) the Milldam Acts; (3)
major drainage and irrigation projects; and (4) oil and gas production
regulations.
In the early 1800s it was common practice for the states to authorize
private corporations to plan, construct and maintain private toll roads.
To avoid the problem of costly detours around the property of uncooperative landowners, the private corporations were given the power to
acquire the necessary rights-of-way upon compensating the landowner.
This same power was later given to private builders of canals and railroads. Thus, the practice was established for a system which transferred
the right to develop some part of a person's property to another private
owner, upon the payment of compensation, and where such transfer is
designated to meet a public need.
In another practice dating back to early colonial days, the private owner
of land through which a stream flowed could erect a dam to harness water
power for the purpose of grinding grain. Damming the stream would
invariably result in the flooding of the land of upstream landowners,
thereby depriving them of their rights to develop that land. These rights
could have been protected by requiring the mill owner to tear down the
dam. Instead, the mill owner, under the Milldam Acts, was permitted to
maintain his dam and gristmill if he paid the upstream owners for their
loss of right to develop the flooded lands.
The Milldam statutes also authorized the miller to grind the grain of
all who requested the service and paid a fee in the form of a share of
flour produced. The courts upheld the Milldam statutes on the grounds
that they were a reasonable police power regulation. Thus, the precedent
was established for the involuntary transfer by the upstream owners of
their right to develop their land, without the exercise of the power of
eminent domain. The mill owners, though, were required to submit to
regulation of their operation for the protection of the public.
Under the early American method of administering drainage and irrigation projects, the courts were authorized to oversee the administration
of a drainage or irrigation district. A majority of the property owners in
the district could vote to undertake an irrigation or drainage project and
impose its costs upon the participating owners in accordance with benefits
received from the project. Some owners might be deprived of the right
75. Carmichael, TransferableDevelopment as a Basisfor Land Use Control, 2 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 55 (1974).
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to develop or use their land so that the water resources could be channeled
to achieve the greatest benefit for the district. Those who received that
benefit would provide the funds from which those who contributed would
be compensated. Thus, a district was created in which the resources of
all participants were pooled and the rights of development were reassigned
within the district to achieve the maximum utilization of local resources.
The fourth precedent described by Professor Carmichael is the regulations on oil and gas production. They were designed to prevent each
owner of property over a gas or oil "reservoir" or "field" from pumping
as much oil and gas as he could, thereby draining the reserves under his
neighbor's property. This practice caused rapid depletion of resources,
waste, duplication, and over investment in drilling equipment. The states
adopted statutes regulating the availability of the common fund of oil and
gas resources for all of the owners of land overlying the reservoirs.
The United States Supreme Court upheld these regulations in a decision76
that recognized the coequal right of all owners to share in these resources.
The decision confirmed the power of the legislature to prevent waste of
resources and provide for a just distribution and enjoyment of those assets
among the collective owners.
Professor Carmichael suggests that this precedent supports the transfer
of development rights concept in that the potential for development within
a planning or zoning district is similar to a reservoir of gas or oil resources.
Regulating development density, type, and timing avoids waste and provides for a pooling of resources and an equitable system for distributing
development rights among the co-owners.
British and Recent American Precedents.Another article describes the
British and recent American precedents from which the transfer of development rights concept is derived." The British used the transfer of
development rights technique in an attempt to establish a system by which
increases in the value of real property resulting from public action would
be recovered and in which property owners whose land was restricted
would be compensated. In the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947,78
the British government acquired the development rights to all undeveloped
land in the nation. This left the owners of land with all other rights of
ownership, except the right to develop. When an owner wanted to develop
his land he had to buy back this right from the government by paying a
development charge. The monies thus obtained went into a revolving
fund that was used to compensate other owners of property who were
denied the right to develop.
76. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
77. Rose, A Proposalforthe Separation andMarketability of Development Rights as a Technique
to Preserve Open Space, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 635 (1974).
78. Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, ch. 51.
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During the period from 1947 to 1971, as the governmental leadership
alternated between the Conservative and Labour parties, the program was
modified frequently. It was ultimately abandoned. At present, the British
government still owns the development rights to all land, but it has not
been able to devise a politically acceptable method to utilize its development rights as an effective technique of land use regulation.7 9
There are several more recent American precedents for the use of a
TDR program for varied purposes. For example, Chicago has proposed
such a system and New York City has used it for the preservation of
landmarks; it has been proposed as a means of preserving open space in
New Jersey and ecologically fragile land in Puerto Rico. Professor John
J. Costonis, one of the leading authorities on development rights, has
written a definitive description of the Chicago plan."0 David A. Richards
described the New York City plan in 1972"1 and reappraised the New
York City program in 1983.82
The programs described in these articles seek to preserve urban landmark buildings by permitting the landmark owner to sell his authorized
but unbuilt floor area to another landowner. These unused development
rights may have substantial value when attached to the transferee parcel,
particularly in high-density commercial zones. Once the excess floor area
is transferred, the authorized floor area of the landmark lot is exhausted
and may no longer be used for higher density development. Thus, the
landmark owner is compensated by the sale of a valuable asset-development rights, as calculated in terms of unused floor area rights. Once
the rights are sold, the economic incentive to demolish the landmark for
higher density development is removed.
One of the serious objections to the use of TDR to preserve landmarks
is also applicable when TDR is used to preserve farmland, whether it is
defensible in planning terns to increase the density in the transferee zones.
The experience in New York City indicates that the transferee lots can
be subjected to overcrowding and congestion. The price of landmark or
farmland preservation through the use of TDR may very well be paid by
those who live in or near the transferee zones. David Alan Richards
79. For additional information about the use of development rights by the British as a technique
of land use regulation, see C. HAAR, LAW AND LAND: ANGLO AMERICAN PLANNING
PRACTICE (1964); Garner, The Law of Land Use Planningin England Today, 15 NAT. RES. J.
491 (1975).
80. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservationof Urban Landmarks,
85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972).
81. Richards, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 56 (1972); see also,
Elliott & Marcus, From Euclid to Ramapo: New Directions in Land Development Controls, 1
HOFSTRA L. REV. 56 (1973).
82. Richards, TransferableDevelopmentRights: Corrective, Catastrophe,or Curiosity? 12 REAL
EST. L.J. 26 (1983).
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concludes his appraisal of the New York City system with the following
statement;
• .. The idea of every parcel being developed to its maximum either

directly or through transfer of development rights while becoming
increasingly popular as a sophisticated expression of laissez-faire, is
essentially a perversion of all that planning had traditionally stood
for. The major thrust behind much of the incentive zoning is growth,
albeit related to economics. Growth, too, is the major characteristic
of cancer.83
The Rutgers TDR Proposal.One of the first comprehensive proposals
to use TDR as a technique to preserve open space in general, and farmland
in particular, was prepared by a committee made up of Rutgers University
faculty and members of the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs
and other experts." The committee, chaired by Rutgers Professor Budd
B. Chavooshian created a system designed to induce owners of undeveloped land to preserve their land as farmland by compensating them
through the sale of their development rights to developers of other land
in the jurisdiction. To make such sales possible, a market would be created
in which owners of developable land would have to buy development
rights from owners of preserved open space land as a prerequisite for
higher density development. The market for development rights would
be created by the following procedures and system:
* Each local government would prepare a land-use plan that specifies
the percentage of remaining undeveloped land in the jurisdiction.
The plan would also designate land to be preserved as farmland
(or other open space). The land-use plan would also designate the
land to be developed and would specify the uses to which the
developable land may be put. A zoning law would be used to
implement this plan.
* The planning board of each local government would prescribe the
number of development rights required for each housing unit to
be developed. On the basis of this numerical assignment, the
planning board would then calculate the number of development
rights which would be required to develop the municipality in
accordance with the land-use plan. The local government would
issue certificates of development rights (ownership of which would
be recorded like a deed) in the exact amount so determined.
83. Id. at 52, citing a letter from Edwin Friedman (then) Assistant District Director for Metropolitan New York, State of New York, Executive Department of Planning Services, to Richards,

Feb. 25, 1972.
84. See, Rose, A Proposalfor the Separation and Marketability of Development Rights as a
Technique to PreserveOpen Space, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 635 (1974); Chavooshian & Norman, Transfer
of Development Rights, URBAN LAND 12 (Dec. 1973).
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* Every owner of preserved open space land would receive certificates of development rights in an amount that represents the
percentage of assessed value of his undeveloped land to the total
assessed value of all undeveloped land to be preserved in open
space in the jurisdiction.
* An owner of developable land, who desires to develop his land
more intensively (for example, to build apartments instead of
single-family residences) would have to buy additional development rights on the open market from those who have acquired
such rights from either original distribution or subsequent purchase.
* The end result is that owners of preserved farmland would be able
to sell their development rights to owners of developable land (or
real estate investors). The legal effect of this sale is that farmers
would thereby sell the right to develop their land in the future.
The money received from the sale is "compensation" (or more
accurately, an amelioration of the harshness of severe restriction
on the use of their land) for keeping their land undeveloped. Their
land will thereby be preserved in agricultural (or other open space)
use and they will have been "compensated" without any capital
costs to government.
* Development rights would be subject to ad valorem property taxation as a component of the total assessed value of the developable
real property in the jurisdiction. (There was a difference of opinion
among the members of the original Rutgers committee on this
issue.)
There are several notable characteristics of the Rutgers proposal: the
first is that development rights are to be put into the form of a legal
document called a Certificate of Development Rights that may be bought
and sold on the open market in a manner similar to sales of registered
bonds. The same economic forces that determine the value of land would
also determine the value of the separated component of the value of land,
namely, the right to develop. No governmental agency would be authorized to tinker with the interplay of economic forces. The goal of the
plan is limited to the preservation of farmland, and other open space, in
accordance with sound planning principles. The plan does not purport to
be a technique for recovering unearned increment in the value of land;
nor does it seek to redistribute economic resources. By limiting its objectives, the proponents of the plan sought to make it more politically
acceptable.
A second innovative characteristic of the original Rutgers plan is that
the certificates would be taxed, as components of real estate value, in a
manner similar to the other components of title. As a consequence, there
would be an incentive for a farmer who, not wishing to speculate in real
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estate, would sell his certificates of development rights. He would then
pay property taxes only on the reduced value of his land for farm purposes.
Purchasers of development rights would also be motivated to use them
quickly or sell them to long-term investors or speculators in real estate.
The owners of the Certificates of Development Rights would pay property
taxes as part of the cost of such investment. This provision would serve
the same purpose as some state farm assessment laws, but would avoid
the criticism that they tend to be more beneficial to real estate speculators
than to farmers.
Another characteristic of the Rutgers plan is that the number of development rights assigned to owners of restricted land would be based
upon the land's value, rather than on the number of acres held. Each
owner would receive a number of development rights in the same proportion to the total number of development rights to be issued as the
value of his land bore to the total value of all other land similarly restricted
to farm use. Consequently, the owner of more valuable land, regardless
of acreage, would receive a greater number of the total amount of development rights than would the owner of a larger tract of relatively
worthless land. The value would be determined initially on the basis of
assessed value with a procedure established to review the assessments
based upon notice of the assessment of all other restricted land.
A fourth characteristic of the Rutgers plan is that the system relates
only to the development rights for residentialunits. The Rutgers proposal
does not purport to be a primary system of land-use regulation. It deals
only with farm land (and other open space) and residential development.
No development rights are created for commercial or industrial development. The members of the committee purposely did not extend the
system to commercial and industrial development rights to avoid the
complex calculations and difficulties of administration that would result.
It was the committee's consensus that although there was no logical reason
for not including commercial and industrial development rights, there
were sufficient practical and political reasons why the proposal should
be kept as simple and understandable as possible.
PsychologicalProblemsof TDR. There are serious psychological, legal
and administrative problems with the Rutgers TDR proposal.8 5 The psychological problem of the proposed TDR system is xenophobia, the fear
of a stranger, an intellectual as well as a social pathology. The fear of
the consequences of the introduction of a strange new concept into the
body of property law is similar in many ways to the fear of the conse85. See, Rose, Psychological, Legal and Administrative Problems of the Proposal to Use the
Transferof Development Rights as a Technique to Preserve Open Space, 6 URBAN LAWYER 919
(1974).
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quences of the introduction of a stranger into the community. In both
cases, there may be a rational basis for concern about the unknown effect
of a new variable upon the existing system. In both cases, the fear can
be dissipated or confirmed by more information and a greater understanding of the alien element. In both cases, the passage of time is necessary
to allay the latent qualms.
There is a rational basis for concern about the effect of the creation of
a separate market and conveyance system for development rights. The
legal system has been compared to a seamless web that responds in many
directions to every tug and pull upon its fabric. No computer has yet
been programmed to simulate the myriad consequences of a legal innovation upon the juridical system. Every proposal for change carries unknown risks; the risks can be minimized by limiting the scope of the
modification from the established path. Anglo-American jurisprudence
has been sustained for centuries by adherence to the principle of stare
decisis and by reliance upon slow, tentative, incremental advances, followed by sufficient repose to measure and absorb the repercussions of
each change before the next advance.
The psychological problem of the proposal for the transfer of development rights results from the fact that it comes on too strong. It comes
on to the scene of well established land use controls with a boldness and
a confidence that shatters the complacency and comfort of well-known
truths and conventional wisdom. TDR calls into question many a priori
principles. It defies classification into known categories; it raises anxieties
about its impact upon cherished and settled doctrines upon which professional proprietary, and psychological stability are founded.
Before the TDR proposal can be adopted it will be necessary to abate
the anxiety, dispel the apprehension, and exorcise the fear of the unknown.
These goals can be accomplished only by better understanding of the
concept and by a greater comprehension of its consequences.
Legal Problems of TDR: Statutory Issues. The legal issues raised by
the TDR proposal fall into two categories: statutory and constitutional.
The statutory issue arises where a local government adopts a TDR ordinance in the absence of specific state enabling legislative authorization.
The typical state legislation will authorize a municipality to adopt zoning,
subdivision, and official map laws but no state has specifically authorized
a municipality to enact a TDR ordinance. The New Jersey legislature
has, on several occasions, considered such legislation but has not adopted
it. To the extent that the TDR ordinance creates new instrumentalities of
title conveyance, such as Certificates of Development Rights, and provides for the recordation and taxation thereof, serious issues arise about
the validity of such local legislation in the absence of state authorization.
A second statutory issue may arise in those states whose enabling
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legislation contain a "uniformity clause." This is a frequently used
provision 6 that requires the regulations of zoning ordinances to be uniform
throughout the district. The argument is made that this provision is violated by a TDR ordinance that permits some land in development districts
to be developed at higher densities than other land in the same district.
There are two possible responses to this argument: (1) The transfer of
development rights ordinance is not a "zoning ordinance" and therefore
not subject to this requirement (but if TDR is not authorized by zoning
enabling legislation, where is the authorization?), (2) There is no violation
of the uniformity requirement because there is uniformity of regulation
in that all property in the district have the same option to develop as of
right or with additional development rights. This argument will be supported by decisions that have upheld cluster zoning, planned unit development, bonus zoning and theater district zoning in spite of the uniformity
provision.
A third statutory issue that may be raised is the argument that a TDR
program involves an unauthorized exercise of the taxing power in that
the provision for higher authorized density in development districts upon
,purchase of development rights in preserved districts is nothing less than
a scheme to raise funds to pay for farmland and other resource protection.
The burden of taxation is imposed upon the owners of land in development
districts who seek to raise the density of development. It is argued that
this exaction constitutes an unauthorized exercise of the taxing power by
the local government that adopts the TDR ordinance. In response, it is
argued that the option of the owner of developable land to buy development rights is not a forced exaction or contribution but rather is a
voluntary act that may be avoided at will and consequently is not properly
a tax.
Constitutional Issues: "taking." In addition to the statutory issues,
there are several constitutional issues that may put the validity of TDR
programs in doubt. It will be argued that a TDR program results in a
"taking" of the property of the farmer or owner of other preserved land
in that the effect of the ordinance is to prohibit the development of his
land in return for the opportunity to sell his development rights. This
argument has been raised in several decisions. In FredF. FrenchInvesting
Co. v. City ofNew York, 87 the New York Court of Appeals considered the
validity of a New York City zoning ordinance designed to preserve park
space through the use of a TDR system. The zoning ordinance in issue
rezoned privately owned property, previously used as a private park in
86. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62 (West Supp. 1983-84).
87. Fred F. French Inv.Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d
5 (1976), discussed in Rose, From the Courts: Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) Program
Invalidated in New York, 5 REAL EST. L.J. 374 (1977).
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a residential complex, for public park use. The effect of this zoning
designation was to prohibit development on this land. In return for this
restriction of development, the corporate owner was permitted to convey
development rights from this land to land not owned by it in a designated
commercial area in the vicinity. The New York court held the zoning
ordinance to be an invalid exercise of the police power under the due
process clauses of the New York State and Federal Constitution.
The first issue that the court was called upon to determine was whether
the change of use of the property by zoning ordinance from private park,
limited to use by residents of the residential complex, to public park,
open to the use by the public at large, constitutes a "taking" of property
under the eminent domain power, for which compensation is required.
The court held that there was no "taking" of property involved. The
language of the decision is particularly significant on this issue:
In the present case, while there was a significant diminution in the
value of the property, there was no actual appropriation or taking of
the parks by title or governmental occupation .... There was no
physical invasion of the owner's property; nor was there an assumption by the city of the control or management of the parks.
Indeed, the parks served the same function as before the amendment,
except that they were now also open to the public. Absent factors
of governmental displacement of private ownership, occupation of
management, there was no "taking" within the meaning of the constitutional limitations .... There was, therefore, no right to compensation as for a taking in eminent domain.88
This analysis is subject to the criticism that it would permit the general
public to use a person's private property without his consent and without
constituting a "taking" for which just compensation would be required.
It is difficult to distinguish this case from an ordinance that designates
private property for highway use and permits the general public to use
that private property for purposes of transportation. In both cases, it would
seem that there has been an expropriation of private property for a public
use that should constitute a "taking" of property and compensation therefor.
In spite of the questionable theoretical basis of this holding, the French
case can be used to support the argument, with respect to the TDR
proposal, that the inclusion of property in a "restricted" district which
may be limited to farmland or environmental protection purposes, does
not constitute a "taking" under the eminent domain power. This is a
critical issue because if the restriction of the use of property under the
TDR proposal is determined to constitute a "taking," then a serious legal
88. 39 N.Y.2d at 595, 350 N.E.2d at 386, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 9-10.
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problem arises because of a long line of decisions that have held that
compensation must be in money and not in other forms of substituted
property. Consequently, with respect to the "taking" issue, the French
case can be cited to support the TDR proposal, subject to the discussion
that follows on the court's holding on the "due process" issue.
The validity of a TDR ordinance, challenged as a violation of the
"taking" clause of the constitution has also been considered by the United
States Supreme Court. In Penn CentralTransportationCo. v. City ofNew
York, 9 the court upheld the validity of the New York City Landmarks
Preservation Law that was adopted to protect historic landmarks from
destruction. The ordinance provided that buildings designated by a landmarks commission as a "landmark" could not be altered or destroyed
without commission permission. Owners of landmark sites are authorized,
under the ordinance, to transfer development rights from the landmark
parcel to nearby lots. The Grand Central Terminal building was designated
as a landmark. Its owner sought permission to build a multi-story office
building over the building. The landmarks commission denied the application.
The United States Supreme Court held that the application of the Landmarks Law to the Penn Central Terminal building and the denial of the
application to use the superadjacent airspace for more intensive building
development did not constitute a "taking" within the meaning of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. This case will be cited in support of TDR
programs to preserve farmland as precedent for the argument that a TDR
program that denies the owner the right to development farmland does
not constitute a "taking" of his property.
ConstitutionalIssues: due process. In addition to the holdings on the
taking issue, both the New York Court of Appeals, in the French case,
and the United State Supreme Court, in the Penn Central case, decided
the applicability of the due process clause to the TDR proposals before
them. The courts came to opposite decisions on this issue. In the French
case, the New York court held that the New York City zoning ordinance
that restricted the owner's property to public park use is invalid under
the due process clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. This
holding was based upon the court's finding that there is no reasonable
relation between the end sought and the means used to achieve that end.
The decision, in turn, involves a weighing, by the court, of the relative
importance of the objective sought to be achieved for the general welfare
on one hand, and the extent of the deprivation or harshness as applied
to the owner of property, on the other. As a general rule, "a zoning
ordinance is unreasonable if it frustrates the owner in the use of his
89. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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property, that is, if it renders the property unsuitable for any reasonable
income productive or other private use for which it is adapted and thus
destroys its economic value, or all but a bare residue of its value."'
This holding is important in determining the validity of TDR programs
to preserve farmland because it raises the issue of the extent to which
the granting of development rights to owners of "restricted" farmland
overcomes the harshness of depriving them of the use of their property
for development purposes. In the French case the court held that the
granting of the development rights did not overcome the harshness of the
deprivation of the owner's rights because the value of the development
rights was "so uncertain and contingent as to deprive the property owner
of their practical usefulness, except under rare and perhaps coincidental
circumstances. 9 '
At first glance, this holding might appear to be a very discouraging
prognosis for the use of TDR to preserve farmland. However, this need
not be the case. The New York court has said no more than that which
students and proponents of TDR proposals have long recognized, namely,
that the viability, as well as the legality, of a TDR program depends upon
"the assumption that the owners of preserved open space land will be
compensated for the deprivation of the use of their land by the sale of
certificates of development rights to owners of developable land. This
relationship is predictable in theory and workable in practice only to the
extent that the planners' projection of future economic demand for land
development is accurate and their designation of sites for specified land
use is skillfully performed." 92 In the French case, the court was not
persuaded (either because of insufficient evidence or insufficient factual
material on which such evidence could be based) that the transferable
development rights, characterized by the court as "disembodied abstractions of man's ingenuity [that] float in a limbo until restored to reality
by reattachment to tangible real property."93
Under the facts of the Penn Central case, the United States Supreme
Court was able to come to a contrary decision. It held that the Landmarks
Law does not interfere with the Penn Central's present use as a railroad
terminal or prevent Penn Central from realizing a reasonable return on
its investment. Nor does the law impose a drastic limitation on the owner's
ability to use the air rights above the terminal because, on the record
before the court, there was no showing that a smaller more appropriate
structure would not be approved. In addition, the court added, the ability
90. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d at 596, 350 N.E.2d at 387,
385 N.Y.S. 2d at 10.
91. 39 N.Y.2d at 600, 350 N.E.2d at 389, 385 N.Y.S. at 13.
92. Rose, supra note 85, at 925.
93. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d at 598, 350 N.E.2d at 388,
385 N.Y.S.2d at 11.

July 1984]

FARMLAND PRESERVATION POLICY AND PROGRAMS

631

of the owner to transfer the air rights to other parcels in the vicinity does
"not leave the property owner empty-handed." The court hastens to point
out that although the development rights would probably not constitute
"just compensation" if a "taking" has occurred, they do mitigate whatever financial burdens the Landmarks law has imposed and are to be
taken into account in considering the impact of the regulation.
The Penn Central case directs attention to two factors that will be
significant in determining the validity of a TDR ordinance to preserve
farmland. The first requirement is that the land that is restricted to farm
use must in fact be appropriate for farm use and capable of providing the
owner with a reasonable return on his investment. Secondly, there must
be a reasonable likelihood that the certificates of development rights are
in fact marketable so that the property owner will not be left "emptyhanded" but will be able to sell them to mitigate the financial burdens
imposed by the land use restrictions to agricultural purposes.
Administrative Problems. The criticism to which the TDR proposal is
most vulnerable is based upon the realization that the success of the
program depends upon the proficiency of the planners and the integrity
of the governing body responsible for its administration. To the extent to
which either group falters, the program may be jeopardized.
The dependence upon the proficiency of the planning profession is
particularly critical. The entire proposal is based upon the assumption
that the owners of preserved farmland will be compensated for the deprivation of the use of their land by the sale of certificates of development
rights to owners of developable land. This relationship is predictable in
theory and workable in practice only to the extent that the planners'
projection of future economic demand for land development is accurate
and their designation of sites for specified land use is skillfully performed.
For example, a market for development rights will be created only if
the owners of developable land find it more profitable to develop at higher
densities with the use of those rights than at the lower densities permitted
as of right. The assumption that more intensive development is more
profitable and that this profit incentive will create a market for development rights appears to be a sound theoretical premise. However, its
implementation in practice will depend upon the accuracy of the planner's
quantitative projections of development demand and the skill with which
designations of land use are made to meet that demand and, at the same
time, fulfill the need to protect the desirable farmland. These determinations will require a measure of art as well as skill. The success of the
program may well depend upon the planner's proficiency in this task.
Even if the planner does his job well, his recommendations will become
vulnerable to political influences when they are submitted to the governing
body. That body of elected officials will be asked to adopt a program that
will have economic and political, as well as planning, significance. Under
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our democratic system, some degree of compromise of the planner's
recommendations would not be unusual. The land designated for development at more intensive use will be given a potential for increased value
in most cases. In other situations, such land may already have increased
in value based upon its development potential and, in spite of its zoning
restrictions, to less intensive use. In all cases, there will be political
pressures imposed upon the governing body to modify the planner's
recommendations to enhance personal, rather than public, objectives.
It is very likely that the political pressures upon the governing body
will tend to increase with the passage of time after the adoption of a TDR
program. There are a number of reasons for this: first, the TDR program
is different from all previously used land use control techniques. It will
take a period of time after its adoption before people become sufficiently
familiar with the concept to determine the course of action in their best
personal interest. Second, under the TDR proposal, the power of zoning
boards to grant variances must be severely restricted. Variances for a
change of use in a preserved farm district may be granted only by the
governing body, with the recommendations of the planning board. Variances for an increase in the density of development in developable districts must be denied and increase in density must be granted only if the
applicant acquires the requisite number of development rights. Third, as
the community develops and the incentives for more intensive land development increase, the governing body will become the primary governmental tribunal in which relief from the restrictions on preserved farmland
is available.
The vulnerability of the TDR program to the vicissitudes of the local
governing body is a formidable problem. The success of the program
depends not only upon the skill and wisdom with which the land use plan
is originally conceived but also depends upon a degree of assurance that
the program will not be abandoned and that the underlying rules will not
be changed along the way. It is generally agreed that the reason for the
failure of the British Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, under
which the British Government took over the development rights of all
undeveloped land, is that landowners refused to develop their land or sell
it in the belief that a Conservative government, when it returned to power,
would change the system. This prediction proved correct, and the British
system of land use control through the use of development rights was,
for the most part, abandoned.9 4 A similar problem will arise in any American jurisdiction that adopts a TDR program.
94. For additional information about the use of development rights by the British government
and the situation in England today, see Rose, supra note 84, at 642-45; Garner, supra note 79.
(1975).
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Avoiding the Problems. Most of the problems described above are
applicable to any TDR proposal which can be characterized as a mandatory system, i.e., the designated farmland is restricted by zoning ordinance to agricultural use in return for certificates of development rights
and the farm owner has no choice. Other proposals may be characterized
as voluntary, i.e., the zoning ordinance permits the designated farmland
to be used for low density residential use as well as farmland. The
farmland owner is given the option of either developing the land or selling
the development rights. If he decides to sell his development rights, then
he relinquishes the option of developing the land. But the choice is his.
The voluntary system has been called a transfer of development credits
(TDC) program. The best illustration of a voluntary TDC system is the
one devised by planner William Queale, Jr. 95 Mr. Queale describes his
system as an extension of cluster zoning wherein a portion of a contiguous
parcel is allocated to open space use and the residential units are clustered
in other parts of the parcel. Queale suggests that the same principle can
be applied to fragmented parcels, i.e., non-contiguous parcels with different ownership. What is required is a voluntary sale of development
rights by owners of land designated for open space to an owner of land
in a developable district who is authorized to increase the density of his
development to the extent of the development rights so purchased. There
are several advantages to this system. First, enabling legislation is not
as critical a legal requirement as it is for the mandatory system where
Certificates of Development Rights must be authorized and property tax
laws must be adjusted. Second, there is no constitutinal "taking" or due
process objection because the owner of the farmland is not deprived of
his right to develop the land, and third, the administrative problems are
eliminated because the voluntary nature of the process avoids the necessity
for precise planning calculations and long standing local governmental
legislative commitments.
The primary advantage of the voluntary TDR system is that it avoids
most of the problems of the mandatory system; the primary disadvantage
is that it is voluntary. It does not purport to be a regulatory system that
can assure the preservation of farmland. For the ardent proponents of
agricultural preservation, a voluntary system may not be enough to achieve
their goals.
REGULATION OF POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY CONTROLLING
PUBLIC SERVICES
A comprehensive analysis of programs to preserve farmland must in95. Queale, Transfer of Development Credits (TDC): A New Form of ClusterZoning, in TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS (J. Rose, ed. 1979).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 24

clude an analysis of the effect of population growth and distribution.
Many cities were settled originally on or near prime agricultural land so
that migration of urban population into the suburbs results, in many areas,
in the destruction of some of the best agricultural land. In other parts of
the country the redistribution of population has created the need for a
state wide urban policy to preserve farmland.
The 1980 census revealed significant changes in the distribution of
population in the United States.96 In the decade between 1970 and 1980
the total population rose by 23.2 million people to 226,504,000. The
major shift in population has been to the south and west. The three sunbelt states, Florida, Texas, and California, increased by more than 10
million people between 1970 and 1980. The increase in population in
these states is attributed to a migration from the snow-belt as well as an
increase in immigration of Hispanics. The shift in national population is
also attributed to a national preference for warm weather (and the consequently lower energy costs), the availability of new jobs created in the
sun-belt states, and a new phenomenon of a growing national preference
for places with lower population densities.
This new preference seems borne out by the changes in population of
major cities and the differences in rate of growth of the states. Population
of the 50 largest cities dropped four percent to 39 million; the next 50
largest cities increased by five percent to 10 million, and the third 50
largest cities increased by 11 percent to over six million. This new preference for places with lower population densities is confirmed by the
differences in the rate of growth among the states. Only two states, Rhode
Island and New York, and the District of Columbia, lost population.
Among the states that grew at a slower rate than the national average are
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Ohio, Connecticut, New Jersey and Illinois. Among the states that grew at a rate faster than the national average
are Nevada, Arizona, Florida, Wyoming, Utah and Alaska.97
As these shifts in population began to manifest themselves during the
second half of the 1970s many government officials took notice and
reconsidered their urban policies. In 1979, President Carter announced
an "urban conservation" policy by which the federal government would
weigh the advantages and disadvantages to cities of various federal programs and would redirect those federal loans and grants that would weaken
established central business districts in distressed communities or promote
96. For an analysis of the shifts in population as revealed by the 1980 census, see, Who's Gaining,
Losing in PopulationRace, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 16, 1981, at 57.
97. Id. at 58.
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unnecessary urban sprawl. 98 The policy resulted from complaints of mayors and urban advisors that the federal government, through its highway,
sewer, and water funds, had encouraged construction of outlying shopping
centers that diverted business from downtown areas.
In 1978, Governor Brown of California proposed an urban strategy"
in which he recommended, among other things, that new urban development in California be located according to the following priorities:
FirstPriority:Renew and maintain existing urban areas, both cities
and suburbs.
Second Priority: Develop vacant and under-utilized land within
existing urban and suburban areas presently served by streets, water,
sewer and other public services. Open space, historic buildings,
recreational opportunities and the distinct identities of neighborhoods
shold be preserved.
Third Priority: When urban development is necessary outside existing urban and suburban areas, use land that is immediately adjacent. Noncontiguous development would be appropriate when needed
to accommodate planned open space, greenbelts, agricultural preservations or new town community development."
The California urban strategy included recommendations to increase the
density of urban areas to help conserve existing urban development,
protect existing neighborhoods, provide incentives for new privte construction, save public dollars for capital facilities and for energy, and help
protect agriculturalland.
At the same time that the California urban strategy was being formulated, Brendan Byrne, then governor of the highly urbanized frostbelt state of New Jersey, proposed a growth policy to direct population
growth away from farmlands, Pinelands and other valuable natural resources, and toward the cities and suburbs to stabilize their economies."''
The objective of the policy was to use the state's regulatory powers and
public funds, such as water, sewer, energy, and transportation, to direct
the movement of population in the state instead of merely responding to
the demands made by development. In Governor Byrne's sixth annual
report to the state in 1980, he expressed the state administration's policy
98. See, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1979, at A20, col. 1; see also, New Federal Policy Against
Suburban Growth, 12 THE MORTGAGE AND REAL ESTATE EXECUTIVES REPORT (Nov. 1,

1979).
99. California Office of Planning and Research, An Urban Strategy for California (1978).
100. Id. at 10.
101. Weissman, Governor Stressing Urban Rebirth in Address on Objectives ForState, The Star
Ledger, Jan. 8, 1980, at 1, col. 4.
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developed areas and away from
to shift population growth to already
0 2
fragile remaining natural resources.
Later that same year, in May, 1980, the New Jersey Department of
Community Affairs released a revised draft of the State Development
Guide Plan °3 (SDGP) in which all land area of the state was designated
for specific land uses such as growth, limited growth, conservation, and
agriculture."° The SDGP is a state-level policy guide that was prepared
to help determine the appropriateness of publicly funded, growth-inducing
developments such as highways and sewers.1" 5
In the Mount Laurel H decision, °6 , the New Jersey Supreme Court
adopted the SDGP to replace the "developing municipality"' 1 7 test that
had previously been used to determine which municipalities have to provide for a fair share of the regional housing needs of low and moderate
income persons. Under the Mount LaurelH decision, only municipalities
in designated "growth" areas in the SDGP will have that obligation. In
the resolution of Glenview Development Co. v. Franklin Township, 08 the
Mount Laurel II decision specifically reaffirmed the trial court's determination that the defendant municipality was an agricultural community
that had not shed its rural characteristics, was located in a SDGP "agricultural" area, and therefore had no distinct obligation to provide low
and moderate income housing."
In many parts of the country, development of farmland is not possible
without water, sewer, and other public facilities. Soil conditions and
underground water resources may permit only limited development that
is dependent upon on-site well and septic tank sewage disposal. Under
these circumstances it is possible for state or local governments to prevent
the development of farmland by not providing these facilities. When local
102. Id.
103. N.J. Department of Community Affairs, State Development Guide Plan-Revised Draft
(May, 1980).
104. Id. at 44, Map XI, State Development Guide Plan Concept Map.
105. Id. at iii.
106. Southern Burlington NAACP v. Mount Laurel Township, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983),
referred to as Mount LaurelH1.For an analysis of this decision and a prognosis of its success, see,
Rose, The Mount Laurel 11 Decision: Is It Based On Wishful Thinking? 12 REAL EST. L.J. 115
(1983).
107. See, Rose & Levin, What is a "Developing Municipality" Within the Meaning of the Mount
Laurel Decision? 4 REAL EST. L.J. 359 (1976).
108. Glenview Development Co. v. Franklin Township, 164 N.J. Super. 563, 397 A.2d 384 (Law
Div. 1978), appeal consolidated into Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
109. Mount Laurel 11, supra, 92 N.J. at 318, 456 A.2d at 472. The author was a planning
consultant to Franklin Township and testified as defendant municipality's expert planning witness
on the question whether Franklin Township is a "developing municipality." The testimony included
the author's opinion that an agricultural community should not have an obligation to provide for a
fair share of regional housing needs for low and moderate income persons.
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governments withhold water, sewer, and other facilities, several legal
issues arise.
There are several landmark decisions on this subject. In Golden v.
Planning Board of Ramapo,"o the New York Court of Appeals upheld
the validity of a program of timed sequential growth that restricted development for a period of up to eighteen years, during which a capital
improvements program for providing municipal services was to be carried
out."' A point system was created based upon the availability of five
categories of facilities and services including sanitary sewers, drainage
facilities, parks and schools, roads, and firehouses. No development permit was issued unless the proposed development accumulated 15 "development points" compiled in accordance with a sliding scale value
assigned to specified improvements. A developer could obtain a special
permit if he provided municipal services himself. The court found that,
under these circumstances, the development delay was not unreasonable.
Since the program included provision for housing for lower-income persons and the restrictions were not permanent, the court did not find it
suspect as an exclusionary zoning device." 2 It is interesting to note,
however, that in 1983, 14 years after its adoption, the Town of Ramapo
13
eliminated the point system as the means of controlling development. 1
The second major decision is Construction Industry Association of
Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma,' 4 which involved the validity of a
city plan refusing to extend water and sewer faclities beyond a prescribed
"urban extension line" and limiting new housing permits to 500 per
year. "5 The Ninth Circuit upheld the restrictive growth plan even though
it observed that "unilateral land use decisions by one local entity affect
the needs and resources of an entire region.""' 6 The court went on to
note that "it does not necessarily follow ... that the due process rights
of builders and landowners are violated merely because a local entity
exercises in its own self-interest the police power lawfully delegated to
it by the state." ' 7 The court emphasized its conclusion that "the concept
of the public welfare is sufficiently broad to uphold Petaluma's desire to
preserve its small town character, its open spaces and low density of
110. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291,334 N.Y.S.2d 138,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
111. See, id. at 367, 285 N.E.2d at 294-95, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142-43.
112. See, id. at 383, 285 N.E.2d at 304-05, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
113. See, Geneslaw & Raymond, Ramapo Dropping Its Famed Point System, PLANNING 8
(June 1983).
114. Construction Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
115. See, id. at 900-01.
116. Id. at 908.
117. Id.
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population, and to grow at an orderly and deliberate pace.' 18 It would
seem that if a municipality can withhold water and sewer facilities to
preserve its small town character and low density, then it may validly
withhold these facilities to preserve its farmland.
Ramapo and Petaluma provide the background for an examination of
two additional decisions involving the limitation of development based
upon the availability of water, sewer, and other facilities. Robinson v.
City of Boulder, 119 involved the refusal of the city of Boulder, Colorado,
to extend water and sewer services to a developer's property because the
land was within an area of restricted growth according to the municipality's master plan. The Colorado Supreme Court held that Boulder
could not refuse to extend the services since the city functioned as a
public utility in the role of sole provider of water and sewerage, and,
short of some utility-related reason, it had an obligation to serve the
people in the subject area. 120 Thus it seems clear that, under the Boulder
decision, the ability of an agricultural municipality to withhold water and
sewer facilities will be governed by the principles of utility law. Water
and sewer facilities might be withheld for utility-related reasons, such as
limited natural or financial resources or limits of geographic jurisdiction,
but not without such reasons. Care and skill will be required to avoid
application of the Boulder decision when creating municipal utilities in
agricultural areas.
A similar situation arises in Associated Home Builders of Greater
Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore.' This case involves the validity of
a municipal ordinance that prohibited the issuance of residential building
permits until certain municipal standards were met for educational, sewage, and water supply facilities.' 2 2
In order to determine the validity of the Livermore ordinance, the
California Supreme Court considered whether it was reasonably related
to the welfare of the region, in addition to that of the municipality. The
court also laid down a three-step test to determine whether the zoning
ordinance is "reasonably related" to the welfare of the region. It instructed
the trial court to: "forecast the probable effect and duration of the re118. Id. at 909.
119. Robinson v. City of Boulder, 190 Colo. 1357, 547 P.2d 228 (1976) (in banc). See, Kelly,
Robinson v. Boulder-A Balance to Ramapo and Petaluma, 5 REAL EST. L.J. 170 (1976).
120. Robinson, 190 Colo. at -, 547 P.2d at 229.
121. Associated Home Builders of Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 17 Cal. 3d 582,
557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
122. See, id. at 588, 557 P.2d at 475, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 43. These standards required that the
California Education Code be followed with respect to double sessions and overcrowded classrooms,
that Regional Water Quality Control Board standards for sewage treatment facilities and capacities
be met, and that there be sufficient water for current human consumption, irrigation, and fire protection
needs. Id. at 589 n. 2, 557 P.2d at 476 n. 2, 135 Cal Rptr. at 44 n. 2.
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striction, . . . identify the competing interests, and... determine whether
the ordinance.., represents a reasonable accommodation of the competing interests.'123
The Livermore decision is frequently cited as an example of a holding
by a state court of a municipality's obligation to provide municipal services required for regional growth and development. The "regional welfare" test imposed by the California court is even more demanding than
the "utility law" principle imposed by the Colorado court in the Boulder
decision. Both decisions are at variance with the position of the federal
courts, such as the Ninth Circuit in Petaluma,2 4 that there is no federal
constitutional principal that requires a municipality to extend its services
and facilities to accommodate regional growth. " These federal decisions
are consistent with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
holding that, in the absence of a showing of intentional discrimination,
to determine the
it is within the constitutional power of local government
26
character, density, and extent of its growth. 1
CONCLUSION
Any appraisal of farmland preservation policies and programs should
consider both long term and short term aspects. To the extent that long
range world-wide population projections accurately predict an ever growing world population, the long range need for farmland preservation seems
to be clear. Current population predictions call for a world population
increase of over two billion people, including 27,000,000 more Americans, by the year 2000.
The predictions made by the National Agricultural Lands Study persuasively support its thesis that the supply of farmland is declining at the
same time that world-wide demand for agricultural products is increasing.
Even with expected (or extraordinary) increased crop yields in the future,
current trends in growth of world population create the possibilities of
hunger, starvation, and death for people in many areas of the world.
From a more selfish point of view, our standard of living as a nation
will depend, in the long run, upon our balance of trade. For several
decades, our primary credit in the world trade balance has been agricultural products. As the Third World countries develop and use cheap labor
123. Id. at 608-09, 557 P.2d at 488-89, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56-57. The application of this test
requires a consideration of the need for municipal services and whether the municipality has attempted
to provide the facilities, as well as a determination that the ordinance bears a substantial relation to
the public welfare.
124. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 934 (1976).
125. See, id. at 908.
126. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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to underprice our industrial exports, our agricultural production will become an even more important national resource.
In the short run, the many development pressures on farmland in the
United States, described above, are present and immediate. The opportunity for personal profit and gain from farmland conversion and development exists now; the advantages of farmland preservation policies will
arise in the future and are more remote. The democratic system rarely
responds effectively to a problem where the advantages of inaction provide
immediate opportunities for profit and gain and the disadvantages are
debateable and remote.
But the problem of building support for a government policy of farmland preservation is much more fundamental: it will be very difficult to
obtain a democratic consensus for a policy of farmland preservation as
long as there is an oversupply rather than a shortage of agricultural
products. As long as warehouses and caverns are brimming with cheese,
butter, dried milk, wheat, corn and other farm products, and this supply
overhangs the market helping to force prices below the current costs of
production, the attention of lawmakers will be directed to programs to
lessen this oversupply. In the short term, government policy-making will
be directed to the issue of how to cope with too much agriculturalproduction now rather than how to preserve farmland for too little agricultural
production in the future.
There is one farmland preservation program that appears to respond to
both the current problem of oversupply of farm production and the future
problem of undersupply of farmland, namely, purchase of excess farmland
by the government for a land bank. The federal government could buy
excess land in periods of oversupply of agricultural products to be kept
in reserve for preservation and use when it is needed in the future.
However, it would seem, that the philosophical and practical problems
of this policy make it an unlikely option at this time.

